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“Instead of working to preserve the existing system, health care regulators need 
to ask how they can enable disruptive innovations to emerge” 
Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Bohmer, and John Kenagy 
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Abstract 
Mobile diagnostics – or mobile health in general – is highly appealing, not only 
for clinicians, but also for patients. It implies empowerment, in particular of those 
who are really in need, such as inhabitants of less developed regions within the 
world who have limited access to healthcare. It also implies simplification: Easy 
data management – a continuous flow of information.  
Therefore, development of miniaturized and highly integrated diagnostic systems 
allowing near patient “instant” diagnostics gain a lot of momentum since more 
than a decade. However, system integration requires time and a significant 
amount of investment. In addition, there is strong competition on resources from 
other emergent technologies, such as next generation sequencing which made 
the collection of e.g. human genome data less expensive and much faster. A 
more severe challenge is that mobile diagnostics require a change in healthcare 
management, e.g. towards integrated practice units. This, in turn, requires imple-
mentation of adequate reimbursement, standards of interoperability, training of 
staff, quality control.  
In 2010, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) 
launched the grant initiative Mobile Diagnostic Systems (MD, 2011─2015) as part 
of its high-tech strategy. MD aimed at generating knowledge on how microsystem 
technologies fit into German healthcare environments. On the basis of interviews 
with multidisciplinary MD actors, this thesis evaluated retrospectively how the 
publicly funded innovation network managed to overcome pre-defined external 
barriers of diffusion, including technology, regulatory affairs and market access.  
Retrospectives reveal internal barriers involving knowledge and technology trans-
fer, negatively influencing generation of innovation. In particular, financing still 
represents a high hurdle for biotech innovators in Germany: Larger firms look 
predominately for market-ready or in-market technologies rather than prototypes 
and venture capitalists are rare or extremely risk-averse. Another important find-
ing was, that actors involved were highly focused on individual work packages. 
This risks of not seeing the whole environment embedding MD. Consequently, 
potential opportunities may be missed, e.g. synergies with relatively close (DIA-
LOC) or more distant initiatives (Global Health Delivery Project-based discussion 
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rounds). This could be partly due to the fact that publicly funded networking ac-
tivities provide less freedom-to-operate because of pre-defined milestones. In ad-
dition, further development of actors with respect to role playing (e.g. boundary 
spanning or innovation selling) is often not included in such “innovation pack-
ages”, but can help to maneuver change. 
Internal barriers need to be addressed first before targeting the major remaining 
external hurdle: Reimbursement. Although the latter was covered within MD, 
standardization of technology evaluation is still an unmet need which strongly 
influences the willingness-to-implement novel mobile diagnostics. Thus, the value 
added is to be demonstrated to justify adequate reimbursement.  
Achieving this goal can be successful, when innovation networking finds its path 
towards a common vision, e.g. towards value-based integrated healthcare. Path-
finding and visioning can be facilitated by process promoter with excellent net-
work management capabilities. In addition, such a promoter could help to further 
develop engagement, openness and commitment of collaborators. Therefore, 
transfer of MD activities to established “top” networks or clusters is recommended 
for securing valuable knowledge generated. In this environment, an important 
next step – globalization of MD for ensuring future return on investment – could 
be triggered as well. 
Since MD innovation was found to involve both product and service innovation, 
maneuvering change is particularly challenging for small and medium sized en-
terprises. These could benefit from engagement in innovation networking. Find-
ings of this case study can help all direct and indirect actors in the field of MD 
innovation or in other high complex environments to reconsider pathfinding as 
well as role playing in networking.  
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1 Introduction 
Many countries, including Germany, are facing the challenge of a significantly 
increasing proportion of elderly inhabitants who generally cause more healthcare 
costs. In 2012, the USA launched a program defined as “choosing wisely”. In 
2016, Germany followed this approach. The initiative aims at reducing under- and 
over-treatment of patients. A significant number of medical doctors do not readily 
accept this approach as they fear that patients will be managed inefficiently due 
to ever decreasing resources. In addition to limited resources, there is a lack of 
adequate technology that supports clinical decision making and management in 
certain disease areas like infections caused by drug-resistant bacteria.  
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) represents a severe health problem. According 
to a recent review AMR leads to about 700,000 deaths every year, and this num-
ber is expected to grow to 10 million deaths in 2050 – if there are no adequate 
reactions (O'Neill, 2016). In May 2015, the WHO1 launched the global action plan. 
Objectives for combatting AMR globally include the development of the “eco-
nomic case for sustainable investment that takes account of the needs of all coun-
tries, and increase investment in new medicines, diagnostic tools, vaccines and 
other interventions”. Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK are lead-
ing the action package AMR of the Global Health Security Agenda, which ensures 
that objectives of the Global action plan are followed. In May 2016, the task force 
around Jim O`Neill came up with the final report on AMR and ten main action 
items. One action item is the promotion of “new, rapid diagnostics to cut unnec-
essary use of antibiotics”.  
Innovative rapid diagnostics that can be used close to the patient in remote set-
tings cannot only positively influence the management of AMR associated infec-
tions – they are also highly needed in outbreak situations, such as the latest Ebola 
and Zika virus outbreaks in 2014 and 2015, respectively: Patients diagnosed ear-
lier can be managed immediately and their prompt isolation can circumvent in-
fection of further persons. From a global perspective, decentralized testing is of 
highest importance for rapid identification of infectious agents. In industrialized 
countries, there is also a strong trend that shifts healthcare to a more patient-
                                            
1 World Health Organization 
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centric value-based approach. Consequently, near-patient testing is also attrac-
tive for personalized management of non-communicable diseases, including can-
cer, diabetes, and neurological disorders. Notably, oncological and specific 
chronical diseases like rheumatoid arthritis are more present in elderly persons 
(>65 years old) who will represent the highest percentage of the global population 
by 2030. This demographic change is expected to further increase healthcare 
costs without countermeasures. Thus, in theory, innovative near patient diagnos-
tics using intelligent algorithms for result analysis, interpretation, and telehealth 
guided reporting could serve as cost-effective platforms that address unmet 
needs in various scenarios. 
In 2004, the ASSURED criteria were defined for rapid diagnostics allowing de-
centralized testing of sexually transmitted infections (Kettler, White and Hawkes, 
2004). Test specifications are associated with each single letter:  
A Affordable  
S Sensitive ─ avoid false-negative results 
S Specific ─ avoid false-positive results 
U User-friendly ─ simple-to-perform and based on non-invasive specimens 
R Robust and Rapid 
E Equipment-free  
D Delivered ─ accessible to end-users.  
In short, an automated laboratory test with excellent accuracy needs to be 
brought into a miniaturized low cost lab-on-a-chip (LOC) or sample-in-answer-out 
format. Often the Star Trek term “tricorder” is used for such highly wanted test 
systems in order to highlight the technological challenge.  
So far, there is no rapid mobile diagnostic system that is disruptive, i.e. easy-to-
use, robust, in-expensive and shows lab-test-like accuracy for most important test 
parameter. However, there are promising technologies in the pipeline. Even 
though these pipeline technologies receive high funding rates since several 
years, the tipping point cannot be predicted easily. Therefore, it is important to 
better understand the barriers that hold back mobile diagnostics from market im-
plementation. 
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1.1 Purpose and Rationale of the Study 
In the Global Innovation Index 2016 Switzerland ranked highest, followed by Swe-
den, UK, the USA and Finland (Dutta, Lanvin and Wunsch-Vincent, 2016). Ger-
many was “only” ranked in 10th position. The impact of innovation is most evident 
in healthcare, where innovation could be measured as gain in QALY, i.e. quality 
adjusted life year. Since several decades, QALY is predominantly used in for 
economic evaluations and represents health outcome based on a combination of 
duration as well as quality of life.  
In 2010, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) 
launched the grant initiative Mobile Diagnostic Systems (MD) as part of its high-
tech strategy. MD aimed at generating knowledge on how microsystem technol-
ogies (lab-on-a-chips) fit into healthcare environments: Potential barriers for in-
novation were to be identified to define measures supporting efficient implemen-
tation. In total, eleven grant projects were financed by BMBF. All projects focused 
on development of microsystems allowing decentralized testing. All projects were 
composed of interdisciplinary teams with members from both industry and private 
and/or public institutes. All collaborators were embedded in an innovation net-
work as set up by BMBF in parallel. 
This case study takes a retrospective look at MD from the biotech industry per-
spective. The study discusses social economic factors triggering an innovation 
friendly environment for new high technological healthcare solutions in general. 
Specifically, it evaluates the impact of the MD innovation network on supporting 
implementation of near patient testing in German healthcare settings.  
1.1.1 Significance of the Phenomena of Interest 
From the industry perspective, regulatory compliant mobile diagnostics develop-
ment is expected to require investment of up to 50 million US dollars ($US) and 
about 5 years (Morel et al., 2016). Next to relatively high investment, there is a 
significant risk of project failure because development involves multiple disci-
plines working closely together (technology promoters). It is further assumed that 
for some marketers (market promoters) internal positioning of new near patient 
technologies within a portfolio of products for centralized laboratory testing may 
represent another hurdle: Industrial decision makers could behave protective by 
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downsizing market opportunity for mobile diagnostics, followed by business case 
rejection. Conflicts of interest may also exist in laboratory decision makers 
(adopters) who could tend to protect their centralized organization against 
change such as potential reduction of lab personal. For users beyond hospital 
settings (e.g. physician offices) limitations in reimbursement for near patient test-
ing as well as regulatory hurdles may result in non-acceptance. Consequently, 
top-management (power promoters) of shareholder-driven biotech companies do 
not easily execute development of mobile diagnostics.  
Catalyst financing at governmental or union level can allow overcoming potential 
internal barriers, thereby increasing willingness-to-innovate. Next to financing, 
the use of a network based-approach is expected to be very powerful for over-
coming external barriers. In case of MD, eleven projects received in total 15 mil-
lion Euro1 over a period of about 3 years2. With respect to the above estimate of 
up to $US 50 million needed for launch, this funding is assumed to allow prototype 
development only. Therefore, it is highly important to evaluate whether funded 
teams manage technology transfer efficiently within the project to ensure that the 
flow does not stop. 
1.1.2 Research Question 
The initiative MD was launched as innovation package, providing a starting point 
for various research questions. The package was reduced to the following 
themes: knowledge management, diffusion of innovation, and innovation net-
work. This thesis will particularly address a single master question accompanied 
by sub-questions listed below. 
Did network Mobile Diagnostics have a sustainable impact on healthcare in-
novation in Germany? 
a. Which socioeconomic factors represent main barriers for implementation 
of lab-on-a-chip (LOC) technologies in German healthcare settings? 
                                            
1 Three projects were below and eight above 2 million €, including ~50% contribution 
2 Some projects were extended after official termination 
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b. How was the Mobile Diagnostics innovation network used to overcome 
potential barriers of technology innovation? 
c. What are the key insights / lessons learnt and how can these be used to 
further empower network-driven healthcare innovation as from different 
perspectives 
 Technology promoters (system integrators) 
 Gatekeeper (project coordinators) 
 Expert Promoter (knowledge manager) 
 Adopter (future user) 
 Market promoters (voice of the market) 
 Power promoter (sponsor) 
 External innovators 
 Process promoter (innovation manager)   
Introduction 
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1.2 Study Design 
The BMBF initiative Mobile Diagnostic Systems included eleven projects funded 
in-between 2011 and 2015. Germany’s “new” high-tech strategy includes five 
strategic pillars (BMBF, 2014). With respect to Mobile Diagnostics, the “priority 
challenge” (Figure 1, item 1) was miniaturization and mobilization of diagnostics 
for allowing rapid near patient testing. Targeted solutions were to “enhance com-
petitiveness and increase prosperity”. This case study will particularly evaluate 
qualitatively how “networking and transfer” (Figure 1, item 2) was managed to 
“strengthen cooperation” and to “support implementation”. 
 
 
Figure 1 Case study Mobile Diagnostics (MD), with focus on networking and transfer 
 *duration of accompanying research is indicated (networking) 
 
Out of the eleven projects in-depth evaluation is performed for a selected project 
with a high number of interdisciplinary collaborators. To discuss potential gener-
alization of findings, coordinators from other projects will be interviewed as well. 
In addition, external perspectives were collected from selected individuals who 
did not participate in MD, but were connected to the network shortly or over a 
longer period. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Innovation Management 
Not surprisingly, priority challenges of Germany’s high-tech strategy are selected 
with respect to the ability to increase competitiveness as well as prosperity 
(→1.2). Since more than three decades Michael E. Porter significantly influences 
individuals’ and organizations’ behavior towards competitiveness (Porter, 1984). 
More recently, he highlighted two strategies for gaining competitive advantage1: 
Get the best versus get unique. The latter cannot be reached by imitation, but 
innovation. Accordingly, sustainable competitiveness requires innovation – if not 
radical innovation. This would be an easy task, if innovation would not be a mov-
ing target.  
What is innovation at all? Innovation has been defined in manifold ways by vari-
ous leaders. Therefore, it is difficult to find a term that is commonly well accepted. 
In general, innovation can be understood as maneuvered change that has a pos-
itive impact on efficiency. In the EU Innovation Union pocket guide innovations 
are defined as “new or significantly improved i) product, ii) marketing approach, 
iii) process or iv) organization” that adds “value to markets, governments, and 
society” (2013). The degree of value added is strongly dependent on how the 
evolution of new solutions – the innovation – is managed. 
2.1.1 House of Innovation 
Schumpeter intensively studied the efficiency of entrepreneurs – the innovators. 
He described early in the twentieth century that creating something new requires 
a specific behavior which is present in a limited number of individuals only 
(Schumpeter, 1912): A high level of energy, willingness-to-change, coupled with 
a strong need for obtaining wealth and power. In his perspective, effective entre-
preneurial activity results in “creative destruction”, i.e. successful market uptake 
of the new creation, followed by elimination of outdated solutions. This phenom-
enon occurs relatively automatically, whereby the innovator resembles a catalyst. 
Contemporary perspectives on innovation consider efficient management of the 
                                            
1 Michael E. Porter: Shared Value and Strategy; Shared Value Leadership Summit New York, NY 
May 12th, 2015 
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whole innovation process – from idea generation to successful market implemen-
tation. Important tasks within the innovation process, as identified by Roberts and 
Fusfeld involve I) idea generating, II) entrepreneuring and championing, III) pro-
ject leading, IV) gatekeeping, V) sponsoring or coaching (Roberts and Fusfeld, 
1980). These critical functions are generally driven by a minority of the team and 
are embedded in non-innovative routine problem solving ideally driven by all team 
members. A.T. Kearney embedded this process within the House of Innovation 
(HOI; →Figure 2; Engel, Diedrichs and Brunswicker, 2010). Coming back to Por-
ter and his advice “get unique” for achieving sustainable competitiveness: It is 
reasonable to assume that all rooms within the HOI need to managed continu-
ously for generating an innovation-friendly environment. Without this holistic ap-
proach, it may be difficult to stay ahead of competition and to ensure profitable 
growth. Here, the HOI is used as an example framework of innovation manage-
ment, demonstrating that commitment of multiple stakeholders with diverse social 
economic behaviors is required and all individuals involved are to be set into the 
innovation context.  
 
 
Figure 2 The House of Innovation as closed (left panel) and open (right panel) version. 
Adapted from: A.T. Kearney (Engel, Diedrichs and Brunswicker, 2010) 
2.1.1.1 Innovation Strategy 
At the top of the roof, new attractive opportunities are defined. These are not 
restricted to new products, but could also be innovative service solutions or new 
business models. Ideally, the envisaged solution is aligned with the business 
strategy. The latter defines the degree of innovativeness, which can be incremen-
tal (routine innovation) or even radical. In the latter case, a new technological 
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solution is used (in biotech e.g. rapid laser-based amplification of nucleic acids 
instead of thermal cycling: new to the world), whereas the incremental approach 
uses existing technology as basis which is “tuned” (Table 1). Various further types 
of innovation have been described, including architectural or disruptive innova-
tion.  
 
Table 1 Types of innovation. Adapted from: Pisano, 2015 & Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 12 
 Technology Core 
System / Linkages Reinforced Overturned 
Unchanged Incremental / Routine                                                     
(multiplex testing) 
Disruptive                                             
(Lab-on-a-chip ) 
Changed Architectural  
(direct-to-consumer testing) 
Radical                                             
(Lab-on-a-chip ) 
 
Inhabitants of the house need to be informed intensively on the vision created at 
the top (2.1.3). A continuous monitoring of the environment embedding the tar-
geted innovation is mandatory to allow in time adjustments. 
2.1.1.2 Life-Cycle Management & Enablers of Innovation 
Life-cycle management (LCM) of an innovation initiates with generation of ideas 
at the fuzzy front end. Selected ideas enter the development process which often 
involves opening of boundaries of the firm for collaboration with external partners 
(Figure 2, right panel). The development phase is followed by launch and moni-
toring of the innovation within its specific environment. A competitive advantage 
can be achieved, if time-to-market is as short as possible.  
This can be only achieved if enabling factors are integrated into the LCM. If more 
complex solutions are envisaged, experts with different knowledge background 
need to be brought together. Interdisciplinary team work requires smooth and 
reliable flow of information. Ideally innovators collaborate closely together under 
one single roof or even in one single room of the house. If this is not possible due 
to regional barriers channels need to be establishes for efficient communication. 
A gatekeeper can help to strengthen collaboration, oversee / allocate resources, 
improve knowledge management (→2.1.2) and monitor achievements which 
could be triggered by supervisory encouragement. Further tools enabling an in-
novation-friendly environment are described under diffusion of innovation 
(→2.1.3). 
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2.1.1.3 Innovation Culture 
As stated above, innovation begins with generating ideas. This process requires 
creativity. In a componential theory by Amabile (2013), creativity can be traced 
back to a combination of knowledge (domain-relevant skills), creative thinking, 
and motivation (excitement) as intrinsic factors as well as the social working en-
vironment as external influencer (Amabile, 2013). The environment is expected 
to have direct impact on individuals’ intrinsic motivation: examples for negative 
impact on creativity include harsh critic of new ideas, politically charged business 
environment, risk-averseness in top managers, and too tight project deadlines; 
examples for positive influencers are interesting challenges, high level of collab-
oration, diversity in skills, strong focus on selected ideas, visionary top managers, 
and effective knowledge sharing. These factors strongly depend on the organi-
zational culture.  
“The way we do things around here” is a term often used to describe culture: A 
group of individuals sharing core values and beliefs – often subconsciously 
(Lundy and Cowling, 1996). Ability-to-innovate and organizational culture have 
long been linked in various studies. Organizational culture could also be consid-
ered as mortar, fixing the house on innovation. A model of (Martins and Ter-
blanche, 2003) highlights eight building blocks influencing innovativeness of a 
culture: (i) mission and vision, (ii) external environment, (iii) means to achieve 
objectives, (iv) image of the company, (v) management processes, (vi) employee 
needs and objectives, (vii) interpersonal relationship, and (viii) leadership.  
Extensively discussed examples for highly innovative cultures are global players 
that were very successful over a long period and still manage to generate sus-
tainable innovations: 3M, WL Gore, IKEA, and LEGO (two based in the US and 
Sweden, respectively). These examples have in common that the organizational 
culture itself provides a competitive advantage that grew over many years – or 
even decades – and cannot be copied easily.  
Particularly small enterprises are often not able to provide all resources internally. 
Thus, many innovation processes are becoming more and more interactive, re-
quiring simultaneous networking across multiple “communities of practice'' (e.g. 
functional groups, business units, IT suppliers) sometimes on a global scale. 
Knowledge needed for innovation is therefore increasingly distributed both within 
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organizations (e.g. across functions and geographically dislocated business 
units) and across organizations (e.g. across IT suppliers, consultants and user 
firms). This poses new challenges for innovating firms in terms of creating, shar-
ing and managing knowledge and expertise. In these situations, knowledge has 
to be continuously negotiated through interactive social networking processes. 
(Swan et al., 1999) That is, the communication of knowledge is only possible 
between people who, to some extent at least, share a system of meaning 
(Trompenaars, 1995). 
Adequate addressing of the innovation strategy may require external collabora-
tors. In addition, an increasing number of enterprises involves lead users in the 
innovation process, ensuring that the solution fulfills user needs and allows suc-
cessful uptake. Accordingly, the innovating organization must be permeable, i.e. 
able to integrate external knowledge easily. A shared understanding and excite-
ment regarding the envisaged innovation is important. This can be a challenge, 
because the two or more parties involved present with different behaviors. These 
are getting particularly evident within specific situations, e.g. if mistakes occur or 
if decisions need to be made on contradicting data. Innovation can benefit from 
tensions, if they lead to constructive change. However, if these tensions cannot 
be resolved due to unwillingness-to-change / -collaborate, the innovation process 
stops. It can be helpful to start the journey with a teambuilding, where collabora-
tors can learn about the other culture in a friendly environment. Takeuchi and 
Nonaka (1995) described such an environment or place as “ba” – a mandatory 
basis for efficient knowledge creation. 
2.1.2 Knowledge Management 
Knowledge can be regarded as accelerator for innovation – if it is generated, used 
and transferred efficiently. This has been confirmed e.g. by Pawlowsky and 
Schmid (2012) based on data of the German industry. Particularly, sharing of 
knowledge has a strong impact on innovation and depends on the behavior of 
each knowledge worker (KW) – a term which has been brought in by Peter F. 
Drucker. He equated KW as capital assets and stated that an increase in their 
productivity “requires changes in attitude not only on the part of the individual KW, 
but on the part of the whole organization” (Drucker, 1999, p. 92). These changes 
could be best triggered when initiated in a small group of KW who were identified 
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to be more open minded, curious and communicative as compared to the remain-
ing work force. Next to a high level of receptiveness, knowledge on knowledge 
management (KM) is an advantage.  
More recently there have been efforts to standardize KM: It has been explicitly 
included into ISO 9001:2015. This norm includes standards for quality manage-
ment and will be effective for all ISO 9001 certified organizations in 2018. The 
embedding of KM in this norm emphasizes on its importance for organizations. 
Four requirements are highlighted in the updated ISO norm: I) definition of 
knowledge mandatory for preservation of the normal business operations, II) its 
regular updating and expansion, III) its effective sharing within the organization, 
and IV) acquisition of new knowledge to react up on external conditions and 
trends. 
For this purpose, it is helpful to find a common understanding with respect to what 
exactly knowledge is. This can be a highly complex task already as knowledge is 
always on the go and therefore hard to tackle. One attempt is the DIKW model: 
data -> information -> knowledge -> wisdom, with an increase in hierarchy from 
right to left or from bottom to the top as it is usually presented in form of a pyramid 
(reviewed by Rowley, 2007, pp. 32–37). Here, knowledge (know how) derives 
from information (know that) and could further be transferred to wisdom (know 
why) that may even be followed by enlightenment (socially accepted and sanc-
tioned acting; Zeleny, 1987). A more detailed approach is exemplified by the 
knowledge latter (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3 Knowledge ladder. Source: Adapted from North and Kumta, 2014, pp. 32–37. 
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Here, it is evident that information can only be turned into knowledge when set 
into context. Turning data into useful or actionable information (knowledge) re-
quires analytical, interpretative as well as collaborative skills. The ultimate goal 
of this knowledge generating process is to act strategically towards gaining com-
petitive advantage. This can only be achieved by going upstairs in high speed, 
i.e. by agile KM. Notably, KM does not mean that the direction is upstairs only – 
it is rather needed to go up and down easily. In addition, it requires juggling of 
both explicit and tacit knowledge, which are often discussed as two major types 
of knowledge. Characteristics of knowledge types are listed in Table 2.  
Table 2 Characteristics of types of knowledge. Source: Alavi and Leidner, 2001, p. 113 
Types of 
knowledge 
Definition  Examples 
Tacit Rooted in actions, experience, and in-
volvement in specific context via men-
tal models (cognitive tacit) or know 
how applicable to specific word (tech-
nical tacit) 
Best means of dealing with specific 
customer 
Explicit  Articulated, generalized knowledge  Knowledge of major customers in a 
region 
Individual Created by and inherent in the individ-
ual 
Insights gained from completed pro-
ject 
Social Created by and inherent in collective 
actions of a group  
Norms for inter-group communication 
Conscious Explicit knowledge of an individual  Syntax of a programming language 
Automatic Individual's tacit, subconscious 
knowledge  
Riding a bike 
Objectified Codified knowledge of a social system  An operating manual 
Collective Tacit knowledge of a social system  Organization culture 
Declarative Know-about  What drug is appropriate for an illness 
Procedural Know-how  How to administer a particular drug 
Causal Know-why  Understanding how the drug works 
Conditional Know-when  Understanding when to prescribe the 
drug 
Relational Know-with  Understanding how the drug interacts 
with other drugs  
Pragmatic Useful knowledge for an organization  Best practices, business frameworks, 
project experiences, engineering 
drawings, market reports 
 
For moving stairs up and down quickly, types of knowledge must be differentiated 
reliably. It facilitates implementation of the right management support tools that 
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serve as a kind of banister. With respect to the last upper stairs (Figure 3, high-
lighted in black), tacit knowledge plays an important role. Knowledge researcher 
Polanyi had a strong focus on tacit knowledge, which is also known as implicit or 
silent knowledge. For him, (scientific) breakthroughs were impossible by using 
explicit knowledge only (Polanyi and Sen, 2010). Nonaka and Takeuchi grounded 
their work on Polanyi’s tacit dimension. However, in contrast to Polanyi they be-
lieve that tacit knowledge can be made explicit, namely by an interplay termed 
SECI (Figure 4; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). 
 
 
Figure 4 Spiral creation of organizational knowledge (SECIng, left panels), exemplified by 
creation of phronesis (right panels). Adapted from: Kawamura, 2014 Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995 
 
SECI translates / converts tacit into explicit knowledge by intensive collaboration. 
Analogy or metaphors (cross-imagination / conceptualization, Figure 4, “E”) are 
used for overcoming Polanyi’s “ineffability” of tacit and highly personal knowledge 
(Nonaka et al., 2000). This translation requires a certain overlap of redundant 
information which is mandatory for establishing cross-imagination, i.e. to ensure 
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that specific metaphors can be taken up and modified (Figure 4, step 3). There is 
a metaphor for this overlap: “ba” – “shared context for emerging relationships, 
which provide a platform for advancing individual and collective knowledge” (No-
naka et al., 2014, p. 369). Organizations knowing how to live SECI are suggested 
to achieve a higher level of innovativeness: Valuable knowledge evolves through 
dynamic and empathic interactions (sharing, creating, and acquiring of 
knowledge) in a continuous, spiral manner. Published examples for successful 
SECIng included the Japanese firm Honda with its innovative city car (Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995). More recently, examples from the finally adopting “western 
world”, e.g. Cisco, were added (Kawamura, 2014).  
This suggests that the organizational culture which is significantly shaped by tacit 
knowledge can play an important role for knowledge generation as facilitator of 
innovation. As mentioned in chapter 2.1.1.3, culture has a significant impact on 
whether KM is efficient and has a positive impact on innovation. For using differ-
ences in cultural behavior as an advantage that fuels creativity, it needs to be 
understood that knowledge is only valuable when in continuous flow and not in 
steady state. This culture also influences dealing with mistakes. If these are not 
accepted and if lessons learned (Figure 4, left panel: Externalization) are not in-
tegrated well in the corporate learning process, new patterns of thinking cannot 
be generated. Consequently, implementation of change is blocked and the inno-
vation process stops. 
Not only usage of tacit knowledge, i.e. the upper black stairs of the knowledge 
ladder, can represent a challenge for the organization: In the past years, there 
was an ever-increasing flood of data (Figure 3, left stairs). For processing of these 
big data, (machine learning) algorithms are regarded as very promising tools 
which help to deliver “good” information – or better: Valuable or actionable in-
sights in time (→Figure 17). However, even well-established flight autopilots 
which are used in every day transportation can make wrong decisions when, e.g. 
connected sensors deliver signals that are automatically set into a wrong context. 
Confidence on data means that at least as many data (and ideally not more) are 
collected and analyzed as needed for obtaining timely and accurate information 
(set of data set into context), providing a valid basis for decision making.  
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Risk cannot be eliminated completely, particularly within innovation processes 
associated with relatively high uncertainties. Balancing risk is strongly depending 
on the knowledge management within an organization and defines the level of 
entrepreneurial power. Thus, information dominates the innovation process be-
cause it has direct impact on risk management. In the future, a main challenge 
for organizations will be noise reduction and to cope with the ever-increasing flow 
of innovation in an agile manner, i.e. to break it down into manageable packages.  
2.1.3 Diffusion of Innovation 
Before focusing on diffusion and the last phases within the innovation process, it 
is helpful to return to zero milestone. John Kao (2007, p. 17) defined innovation 
as “the ability of individuals, companies and entire nations to continuously create 
their desired future”. His view implies that a strong visionary leadership is of im-
portance, guiding the innovation process. In addition, it also suggests that political 
affairs can strongly influence whether the desired future can be created or turns 
out as an illusion. A desired future often relates to a specific socioecological en-
vironment and compares the situation today with those in, e.g. year 2020: Year 
2020 as desired (with maneuvered change) and year 2020 as not desired (without 
maneuvered change). For better envisioning of year 2020, a technique described 
as foresight may be a good starting point: “What you foresee is what you get” 
(principle #1: Carleton et al. 2013, p. 14). For some this may sound spiritual or 
remind of Nonaka’s phronetic visionary leadership (→2.1.2; Figure 4, right panel). 
However, at least one point of the Stanford foresight method (SFM) sounds ob-
vious: “You can’t cheat at innovation” (Carleton et al. 2013, 32, item 10). SFM is 
based on the following five phases: 
I) perspective — using lessons learned to predict the future  
II) opportunity — identifying upcoming changes in customer needs 
III) solution — identifying answers to industry-related questions 
IV) team — selecting team members regarding needed talent and leader-
ship profiles 
V) vision — driving towards the desired future by engagement of the 
whole team  
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Table 3 Tools supporting the Stanford foresight method. Adapted from: Carleton et al., 2013, 
pp. 18–20 
Phase & Tool Related techniques Our unique benefit 
I) Context Maps            
 Brain Storming  
 Mind Mapping 
Retains complexity of topic, 
while beginning to converge on 
priority areas 
I) Progression Curves   S-curve (technology 
adoption) 
 Historical timelines 
Connects multiple related 
events and highlights prece-
dents 
I) Janus Cones            
 Cones of uncertainty 
 Milieu studies 
Uncovers indirect influencers 
and events within an era 
II) Generational Arcs   Population analytics 
(demographics) 
 Generational research 
Identifiers relevant population 
group and shared values 
II) Future User          
 User personas 
 “VoC”* exercises 
 Need-finding 
Describes future user needs 
without extrapolating biases 
from today’s users 
II) Future-Telling           
 Storytelling  
 Experimental design 
 Use cases  
 Role playing 
Conveys nonverbal and contex-
tual details about a future use 
case 
III) White Spots              
 Growth-share (BCG) 
matrix 
 Blue ocean strategy 
Determines future focus of op-
portunity through iterative filters 
III) Paper Mock-ups   
 Prototyping (low fidelity)  
 Scale models (ma-
quettes) 
Produces system models that dis-
play the interactions and related 
components 
III) Dark Horse  Out-of-box thinking 
 
Resets idea back to essential 
core innovation 
III) Change Path       Backcasting 
 Strategic inflection 
points 
Prioritizes top decisions based 
on direct path to desired future 
IV) Buddy Checks         
 Start-up speed dating 
 Role playing 
Let you quickly filter promising 
innovation partners and team-
mates 
IV) Voice Stars               
 T-shaped people 
 Career planning tests 
 Creative leadership pro-
file 
Describes the mix of traits 
needed for radical innovation 
leadership 
IV) Crowd Clovers         
 Social network mapping 
 Weak ties 
 CoIN 
Identifies types of relationships 
required for fostering a culture 
of innovation 
V) Vision Statement      
 Start-up elevator 
pitches 
 Mission statements 
Provides a simple formula to tell 
a future vision 
V) DARPA Hard Test   
 Technology readiness 
scales 
 
Evaluates future vision in terms 
of its breakthrough potential 
V) Pathfinders              
 Wayfinding 
 Diffusion of innovation 
 Knowledge activists 
Charts the most efficient suc-
cess path for an innovation idea 
through an organization 
Abbreviations: BCG, Boston Consulting Group; CoIN, Collaborative innovation network; 
VOC, voice of the customer 
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In principle, the method could be integrated under the roof of the house of inno-
vation as basement (innovation friendly environment; →2.1.1.2). Two elements 
of the tool box are DARPA Hard Test and Pathfinder (Table 3, Carleton et al., 
2013, p. 20). These are useful for evaluating breakthrough-ability of technologies 
and for diffusing innovation, respectively. According to Rogers (2002, p. 2), “dif-
fusion is the process through which (1) an innovation (2) is communicated 
through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of a social sys-
tem”. Some individuals adopt immediately, whereas the majority (>90%) lags. 
The degree of lagging behind can be slightly (early adopters: 13.5%), moderately 
(early and late majority: both 34%) or high (laggards: 16%; Rogers, 1983, p. 247). 
Innovation characteristics affecting diffusion include (Rogers, 1983, pp. 14–15): 
 Relative advantage — the innovation is superior as current solutions 
 Compatibility — the innovation fits unmet user needs 
 Complexity — the innovation has a high ease-of-use 
 Trialability — the innovation can be tested first prior to potential adoption 
 Observability — impact of innovation can be traced 
2.2 Innovation Networks 
As indicated in the House of Innovation, the product development process must 
not take place within the boundaries of the firm. More than two decades ago, 
more and more high tech companies, including biomedtech firms, started to in-
corporate external knowledge within some or even all steps of innovation. This is 
because generating a unique solution often involves more than one discipline: 
e.g. sensor technologies may need to be connected for sending data securely to 
a specific data base. In addition, globalization increases competition and it can 
be observed that life-cycles of products decrease. Mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) can provide access to needed know-how or help to reduce time-to-market. 
However, one hand M&A often fail (e.g. potential loss of incorporated knowledge) 
and on the other hand an SME may not have the legal, financial, and administra-
tive background needed to execute an M&A. Therefore, formation of R&D part-
nerships can be a superior solution, where resources, costs and risks could be 
shared. Other examples for collaborations are joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
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or distribution agreements. In addition, partnerships between private and/or pub-
lic partners (PPP) have been triggered significantly by research grants favoring 
interdisciplinary team work. In parallel, match making opportunities were sup-
ported publicly by network or cluster initiatives. The latter is a specified network 
linked to a specific region and technology in focus (e.g. Silicon Valley in the USA 
or microTEC Südwest in Germany).  
Networks usually evolve by loose relationship building between independent ac-
tors who share specific goals (Johannisson, 1987). This relationship can get 
stronger as time goes by. Bonding is positively influenced by open communica-
tion, trust and success stories in-between networkers, such as knowledge gen-
eration. The stronger the bonding, the smoother the flow of information. Negative 
influencers include conflicts of interests resulting in power distances between ac-
tors. In this case, knowledge sharing is rather difficult if not impossible. Thus, the 
dynamics and interaction patterns within a network strongly depend on behaviors 
of actors involved. Consequently, each network has its own footprint which makes 
its classification difficult.  
According to OECD (2014, p. 221), “the main rationale for public policies to pro-
mote clusters, through infrastructure and knowledge-based investments, net-
working activities and training, is an increase in knowledge spillovers among ac-
tors in clusters and thus the generation of a collective pool of knowledge that 
results in higher productivity, more innovation and increased competitiveness”. 
Networks can help to complement codified knowledge (as presented e.g. in re-
ports) by tacit knowledge. This can facilitate decision making. Thus, networks can 
provide the place, which Nonaka and Takeuchi termed “ba” (→2.1.2): A place for 
accessing and sharing various information outside the own organization which 
may be hierarchical, cumbersome or characterized by silos of departments.  
Innovations are associated with a high degree of uncertainty, such as technolog-
ical uncertainty. In addition, markets can present with a lack of transparency, with 
inconsistent voices of future customers and key opinion leaders. In an innovation 
network, reduction of uncertainty could be obtained by interorganizational collab-
oration of interdisciplinary actors is suggested to increase the power to disrupt 
established technology. “Innovation depends on harvesting knowledge from a 
range of disciplines besides science and technology, among them design, social 
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science, and the arts” (Kao, 2007, p. 19). Network-based innovation approaches 
can facilitate what Schumpeter termed “gales of creative destruction” (Powell et 
al., 1996). Thus, an informal and voluntary combination of network resources 
(e.g. technological with market expertise) may increase willingness-to-innovate, 
whereas standalone enterprises may not overcome their risk averseness (De-
Bresson and Amesse, 1991). 
 
 
Figure 5 Typology of transaction. Adapted from: DeBresson and Amesse, 1991, p. 365 
 
This advantage inherent to innovation networks also bears a disadvantage: Col-
laborating innovators may not easily find a consensus because of differences 
between innovation culture of each single partner (→2.1.1.3). In addition, net-
working individuals may come into a hazardous competing situation which makes 
it difficult for them to differentiate between friends and foes. An anticipated bar-
rier-free communication as well as relinquishing control may become an illusion. 
With respect to potential risks on return of investment (ROI), Powell and col-
leagues (1996, p. 117) compared the decision whether to collaborate or not as 
“variant of the make-or-buy decision, framed largely in terms of transaction cost 
economics”. Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006, p. 660) proposed a framework for influ-
encing ROI actively within innovation networks: Orchestrating of “knowledge mo-
bility, innovation appropriability, and network stability” rather than passive behav-
ior is at least for key actors a superior strategy. 
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2.3 Innovations in Healthcare 
As for other segments, innovations in healthcare can be differentiated in contin-
uous and discontinuous innovations. The latter results in a new technological par-
adigm. This process can be influenced by various factors, e.g. scientific break-
throughs, economic benefits, institutional circumstances as well as limitations of 
existing technological solutions (Dosi, 1982). Theories discussing drivers of inno-
vation are generally directing towards either a “demand-pull” or “technology-
push” approach. Demand-pull approaches focus on unmet or insufficient met clin-
ical needs. An example would be a medical surgery device that allows in situ 
identification and labeling of tumor tissue, followed by a precise and guided re-
section. A technology-push approach would argue that a new technological solu-
tion like digital printing allows creation of innovative products like on demand pro-
duction of patient-specific implants. These “black or white” considerations have 
their limitations as an innovation process may evolve in the “grey zone”, i.e. a 
user-centric approach that uses a specific technological approach which seems 
to be most appropriate to fulfill unmet needs identified. From health perspective, 
an innovation improves the outcome of a patient significantly: patients have a 
benefit that is measurable in a real-world scenario.  
2.3.1 Drivers 
Over the past two decades, healthcare expenditures increased only slightly in 
Germany (Figure 6). Highest expenditures can be assigned to the USA (17.1% 
of GDP in 2013). In Germany, healthcare spending amounted to 11.2% of GDP 
in 2013, which is significantly lower. However, with respect to the demographic 
changes, i.e. a significant increase of individuals older than 60 years, it is im-
portant to install countermeasures. These include the choosing wisely program 
which was initially launched in the USA in 20121. As one can assume, this initia-
tive aims at reducing diagnostic and therapeutic measures in a “wise” manner. 
Diagnostic procedures such as MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) provide one 
example: In 2013, there were e.g. 107 MRI performed in 1,000 inhabitants of the 
USA, whereas the OECD median was roughly half of it (Squires and Anderson, 
2015). Here, the question may evolve whether less is more. The higher use of 
                                            
1 http://www.choosingwisely.org/ (accessed on February 25, 2017) 
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health technology in the USA may also suggest that technology adoption shifts 
more to the left on a time scale, i.e. percentage of innovators and early adopters 
is higher compared to other countries (→ 2.1.3). Therefore, healthcare cost can-
not only be evaluated with respect to actual cost, but also need to balance inno-
vativeness of a certain industry, e.g. biomedtech industry with companies such 
as GE healthcare. Another example is genetic sequencing that has been pushed 
by billions of US dollars in the nineties. More than two decades later return on 
investment can be observed.  
 
Figure 6 Healthcare spending (% of GDP1, 1995‒2014; OECD Health Data, October 2016)  
 
Another important driver are the patients themselves. Workers shifted more and 
more from blue collar to knowledge worker over the past decades. This shift went 
along with an increase in life expectancy, particularly in high income countries. In 
case of an illness, individuals have more time to focus on disease management. 
Since digitalization has facilitated access to information, they are also able to 
identify latest breakthroughs in healthcare. This allows patients to influence dis-
ease management. 
2.3.2 Moves 
The term “mobile” within Mobile Diagnostics implies that innovations restricted to 
a technological solution are not fulfilling the needs of all users in healthcare any-
more. By contrast, technological solutions allow higher implementation rates, 
when embedded into service solutions. In 2014, consulting firm Deloitte provided 
                                            
1 GDP, gross domestic product 
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a 2020 outlook for healthcare and Life Sciences including the following 10 pre-
dictions (Taylor et al., 2014, p. 3):   
1. Empowered patients 
2. Digitalization of patient management  
3. Monitoring of clinical parameter and “quality of life” by mHealth solu-
tions 
4. Big data supported clinical decision making 
5. Convergence of technology and science 
6. Network-based interdisciplinary R&D approaches 
7. Towards value-based healthcare 
8. End-to-end process governance by GBS (Global Business Services)  
9. New business models for emerging markets 
10. Recovery of corporate reputation by generating trust 
The first five predictions are external moves, whereas the remaining focus on the 
industrial environment. In the following, two items (3. & 7.) will be highlighted. 
Towards Value-Based Healthcare 
One move – particularly shaped by Michael E. Porter – is towards a value-based 
healthcare (VBH) system (Porter and Guth, 2012; Porter, 2010). Notably, value 
of care has ever been in focus. However, the VBH approach aims at standardiz-
ing assessment of value added (→Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7 Added value. Adapted from: Zeleny, 2006, p. 9 
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This approach can help to identify whether management is efficient or needs to 
be adjusted. Added value refers not only to a specific step within patient manage-
ment, but intents to consider the whole patient management cycle (→Figure 8). 
This process can be termed health technology assessment (HTA), if the value is 
added by a specific technology. 
 
Figure 8 Assessment of value added in healthcare. Adapted from: Porter and Guth, 2012, 
p. 37 
 
Towards Patient-Centered Decentralization 
A further move, aligning with the VBH approach, is to use more patient-centered 
management procedures in specialized setting such as integrated practice units 
(IPU). According to Kodner and Spreewenberg (2002, p. 3), “Integration is a co-
herent set of methods and models on the funding, administrative, organisational, 
service delivery and clinical levels designed to create connectivity, alignment and 
collaboration within and between the cure and care sectors.” Within IPU, teams 
of medical experts take care of patients in a multidisciplinary manner, with the 
goal to obtain best outcomes as possible.  
Individuals can differ significantly and thus, information should be set into the 
specific (e.g. genetic) context of each patient. Personalized medicine is an at-
tempt to design a individual patient management. For this purpose, additional 
information obtained by e.g. biomarker analysis can be helpful for determining 
adequate treatment options or to monitor outcome (→Figure 8). Ideally, this in-
formation can be obtained near to the patient and in time to achieve immediate 
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impact on patient management. Even test-and-treat algorithms can be per-
formed: Biomarker levels are measured onsite and then the physician decide 
whether e.g. antibiotics are useful or not. Thus, novel near patient diagnostics 
can support VBH within IPU. 
2.3.3 Barriers 
Innovations are embedded into uncertain environments. Sometimes the environ-
ment is even unfriendly due to hurdles, such as those included in the EU Innova-
tion Union guide (2013, p. 8):  
 weaknesses in public education and innovation systems 
 poor availability of finance 
 costly patenting 
 outdated regulations and procedures 
 slow standard-setting 
 failure to use public procurement strategically 
 fragmented efforts among member countries and regions 
In healthcare, environments can be extremely unfriendly, if not frosty. Implement-
ing new solutions can be unpredictable and time consuming. Potential barriers or 
influencers of innovations in the field of mobile diagnostics have been addressed 
within the initiative Mobile Diagnostics (MD; see next chapter). These include 
technology, quality and regulatory affairs as well as market-related barriers – 
components of the PESTEL analysis. PESTEL aims at generating a reliable pic-
ture of a country-specific, macroeconomic situation, namely political, economic, 
social, technological, environmental and legal.  
External factors can have a significant impact on a company’s innovation strat-
egy. Therefore, it is important to include only information which is relevant for the 
target innovation. In addition, information needs to be handled carefully as mis-
leading group think can occur, i.e. a swan turns black although it is white and vice 
versa.   
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2.4 Innovation Package Mobile Diagnostics 
The initiative Mobile Diagnostic Systems (Mobile Diagnostics, MD) was launched 
in 2010 by BMBF1 as part of the country’s high-tech strategy. Historically, BMBF 
grants have a strict focus on R&D. In this case, integrated microsystem (lab-on-
a-chip) technologies for biotechnological applications was the target. The target 
is reasonable with respect to future demographical changes and an expected in-
crease in healthcare expenditures (→2.3.1): A promising outlook to cost-efficient 
diagnostic decentralized testing, particularly in rural areas with time consuming 
transportation of patient samples to more distant laboratories. 
In total, eleven collaborative R&D projects were supported in parallel, resulting in 
a competitive set-up. The majority of projects consisted of multidisciplinary teams: 
Academic researchers, industrial partners and clinicians who represented the 
voice-of-the-customer in user-centric system integration approaches. Industry 
partners were predominately SME (small and medium enterprises). System inte-
gration was accompanied by an interdisciplinary team of knowledge manager 
who addressed selected barriers or influencers listed above (→2.3.3). Their mis-
sion was to support funded system integrators and to generate a better under-
standing for the innovation environment embedding lab-on-a-chip technologies. 
For this purpose, the whole value chain was considered by including specific 
needs of integrators. Accompanying actors had also the goal to create awareness 
for mobile diagnostics within the German health sector and beyond: Science mar-
keting and community building were performed under the umbrella “Mobile Diag-
nostics” as innovation pitch. Notably, MD innovation networking was meant to be 
sustainable, i.e. after termination of MD successful transfer to established net-
works was envisaged.  
In this thesis accompanying actors are defined as promoters referring to the 
model of Eberhard Witte (1973). This model describes two types of promoters – 
expert promoters (EP) and power promoters who are responsible for knowledge 
creating and ensuring resources, respectively. More recent studies added pro-
cess promoters (or champions; Chakrabarti and Hauschildt, 1989), relationship 
promoters (Gemünden, Salomo and Hölzle, 2007). The latter study could show 
                                            
1 Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
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that specialized promoters have a positive impact on success of innovation. Fur-
ther, the authors assigned relationship promoters an important role as “boundary 
spanners”.  
Table 4 Key actors within Mobile Diagnostics Innovation Network 
Key Actor Official Description  Role 
GK, Gatekeeper Project coordinator Cross-organizational flow of knowledge 
EP, Expert Promoter Knowledge manager  Knowledge generation and transfer 
 
In this thesis, relationship promoters are designated as gatekeepers (GK) to dif-
ferentiate them from promoters (Table 4). GK function as sensors and transmit-
ters: They identify and capture useful information as well as potential collabora-
tion partners. “The technological gatekeeper mediates between his organiza-
tional colleagues and the world outside, and he effectively couples the organiza-
tion to scientific and technological activity in the world at large” (Allen, 1970). 
Thus, a GK is interactive and requires excellent networking skills.  
Within MD, GK were represented by coordinators of each R&D project. They in-
teracted predominantly with collaboration partners within project boundaries. 
However, GK were also responsible for external interaction with GK from other 
projects and knowledge managers, i.e. EP. EP were responsible for knowledge 
generation and diffusion. Because of their profound analytical expertise, an EP 
can deal with high uncertainty and ambiguity inherent to innovation. Furthermore, 
EP identify and analyze potential barriers of innovation efficiently.  
As in case of MD, more than one EP can be involved in innovation processes. 
This is depending on project size, complexity and degree of innovativeness (e.g. 
routine versus radical innovation). In MD, one or more EP were related to each 
potential barrier identified. With respect to Nonaka’s model of knowledge man-
agement (→ 2.1.2; Figure 4), experienced EP may facilitate creation of ba: They 
may promote collaboration or networking between different stakeholders for initi-
ating complex learning. In MD, compiling of information was intended to be timely, 
agile and actionable. For knowledge transfer, different formats were used, in-
cluded face-to-face meetings with integrators. These meetings were also fore-
seen to connect actors with each other for promoting community building as men-
tioned above. 
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3 Methodology 
This thesis is a case study on the initiative Mobile Diagnostic Systems (MD) 
launched by BMBF in 2010. Details are given in Table 5.  
Table 5 Overview: Initiative Mobile Diagnostic Systems 
Where Germany, nation-wide 
When 2011 to 2015 
Who Participants from public and private organizations 
What Development of microsystem technology-based mobile diagnostics (lab-on-a-chip, 
LOC) for biotechnological application in healthcare settings (hospitals and physician 
offices / integrated practice units)  
How Interdisciplinary and user-centric system integration, accompanied by knowledge 
workers who supported the innovation process over the whole value chain 
Why To gain knowledge on how targeted technologies fit into the environment and to re-
duce the level of uncertainty associated with these new technologies  
Driver Need to re-define healthcare due to significant healthcare costs and demographic 
changes leading to a significant increase in individuals older than 65 years over the 
next decades 
Volume 11 funded projects  
 
Since initiative MD ended in 20151, this thesis takes a retrospective look at it. 
Focus is on key activities within the MD-related innovation network and socioec-
onomic factors influencing the complex undertaking of innovating German 
healthcare. Qualitative analysis was performed to understand maneuvering of 
change needed to introduce novel lab-on-a-chip technologies into healthcare set-
ting. In this context, interviews were performed with 19 MD innovators as internal 
perspectives.  
In addition, four external perspectives were included by interviewing individuals 
who came in contact with the MD network. Finally, one interview with a network 
and cluster expert was added, resulting in a total of 23 interviews. This retrospec-
tive is intended for teams targeting innovations in healthcare. It highlights activi-
ties in MD that went well and those that may need to be improved for addressing 
potential barriers of diffusion more efficiently (Figure 9). Finally, it provides an 
outlook on how activities of the MD innovation could be continued for further driv-
ing decentralization.  
                                            
1 Project end refers to the companion research  
Methodology 
 
29 
 
Figure 9 Mobile Diagnostics: Innovation networking towards decentralization                     
(Abbreviations: PO, physician office; LAB, laboratory; IPU, integrated practice unit) 
3.1 Data Collection  
Data were collected based on interviews. Interview partners were selected in a 
way that different perspectives were covered for one of the biggest interdiscipli-
nary MD projects: Gatekeeper, adopter, power promoter, technology promoter 
and market promoter. These actors were from public as well as private organiza-
tions. Both executive and managerial level were presented by the interviewees. 
In addition, gatekeeper perspectives of five further MD projects were collected. 
These perspectives were complemented by those of individuals who conducted 
MD knowledge management (i.e. expert promoters).  
Prior to each interview, participants were provided orally with background infor-
mation concerning the researcher and the research object, i.e. case MD. In addi-
tion, they received information on the interview procedure itself, including planned 
time-frame. All participants were informed that data is handled anonymously and 
participation is voluntary.  
The majority of interviews were scheduled as telephone interviews, only two par-
ticipants were interviewed face-to-face. All participants were asked whether they 
agree that the interview is being audio-recorded. Before starting the interview, 
there was time to answer open questions of participants. Written informed con-
sents are available in German language for all participants, including agreements 
upon audio-recording (an example form is attached).  
Interviews were on average about 40 min in duration (range: 24‒96 min). All in-
terviews were audio-recorded and only a limited number of notes was made. This 
allowed high concentration on the interview partner. Interviews were performed 
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in German and in a semi-structured manner using predominately open questions. 
A standardized part related to potential barriers of innovation in the field of mobile 
diagnostics – the work package addressed by expert promoter of the companion 
research team: 
 Technology 
 Standardization 
 Regulatory Affairs 
 Market Access / Reimbursement  
 Diffusion  
3.2 Description of Actors 
An overview of interview participants interacting directly or indirectly with initiative 
MD is given in Table 6. Actors were categorized with respect to eight different 
perspectives on the innovation network. These are described below. In addition 
to their perspectives, roles and hierarchies are indicated. Of the 23 participants, 
all are Germans, and 6 (26%) are female. Three interviewees shifted their focus 
significantly beyond near-patient testing since termination of initiative MD (Table 
6: AD-II, GK-V, GK-VI). Categorization of actors’ perspective is based – with 
some adaptations – on the promoter model that has been further developed since 
its introduction by Witte (1973). Promoters can be understood as actors who sup-
port the innovation process intensively by overcoming resistance. In this thesis, 
perspectives are related to specific barriers that need to be overcome. It is im-
portant to note that roles of actors can overlap significantly. Actors who were 
more in-directly involved within the MD innovation network are highlighted in gray 
in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Characteristics of interview partners 
# Perspective Role in mobile diagnostics (focus today) Gender  
(age range) 
 Technology Promoter 
1 TP-I Director of R&D, non-profit organization (MD) M (35-44) 
2 TP-II Senior Scientist R&D, industry partner (MD M (35-44) 
3 TP-III Group leader R&D, public institution (MD) M (40-49) 
 Gatekeeper   
4 GK-I Entrepreneur, industry partner (MD) F (40-49) 
5 GK-II Director of Finance, industry partner (MD) M (40-49) 
6 GK-III General Manager, NPO (MD) M (50-59) 
7 GK-IV Manager in R&D, Industry partner (MD) F  (40-49) 
8 GK-V Manager in R&D, Industry partner (biotech) F (40-49) 
9 GK-VI Director of R&D, Industry partner (medtech) M (45-55) 
 Expert Promoter 
10 EP-I Knowledge Manager, NPO (standardization) M (45-55) 
11 EP-II Scientist R&D, NPO (rapid diagnostics) M (45-55) 
12 EP-III Knowledge Manager, NPO (healthcare innovation) F  (35-44) 
13 EP-IV Knowledge Manager, NPO (healthcare innovation) M (30-39) 
 Adopter   
14 AD-I Specialist Lab Medicine, hospital lab (IT & eHealth) M (35-44) 
15 AD-II Specialist Lab Medicine, private lab (business) M (40-49) 
Market Promoter 
16 MP-I Director of Marketing, NPO (science marketing) M (30-39) 
17 MP-II Market Access Expert, NPO (reimbursement) F  (40-49) 
Power Promoter 
18 PO-I Top manager, biotech industry (business) M (45-54) 
19 PO-II Top manager, biotech industry (marketing) M (45-54) 
 Externals   
20 XT-I       (XT-EP) Knowledge Manager, public institution (social science) M (45-55) 
21 XT-II      (XT-MP) Application Expert, SME (marketing) F  (30-39) 
22 XT-III     (XT-PO) Entrepreneur, start-up (business) M (40-49) 
Process Promoter 
23 PP Expert in Technology Cooperation, NPO M (45-54) 
Abbreviations: Lab, laboratory; MD, Mobile Diagnostics; NPO, non-profit organization  
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Technology Promoter Perspective 
Technology promoters (TP, n=3) are motors of the organizations’ R&D, holding 
the technology related knowledge. Here, three different R&D organizations are 
represented: public institution, non-profit organization, industrial partner. All SI 
collaborated in one of the biggest MD system integration projects. One integrator 
(TP-I) was involved in more than one project. TP are experts in a specific (bio-) 
technological field in which they worked for at least 5 years. Represented disci-
plines are: Physics, biochemistry, engineering. Included SI cover the whole sys-
tem integration process: Instrument with optics, microfluidic cartridge, and test 
technologies (immunological and molecular detection of specific parameter). 
Gatekeeper Perspective 
Gatekeepers (GK, n=6) are sensor and transmitter of information. Their role can 
also be defined as boundary spanner or relationship promoter who is usually 
strong in identifying and connecting to partners (Gemünden et al., 2007). De-
pending on GK’s background (e.g. technology, finance or marketing), these part-
ners can be R&D collaborators, suppliers, key opinion leaders or customers. Orig-
inally the term gatekeeper was shaped by Allen (1970) who considered GK more 
in the context of closed organizational boundaries, where information was pre-
dominately brought in by GK. Relationships and the quid pro quo custom may not 
have been as important as today. However, GK’s role in MD is multidirectional 
exchange of knowledge, which can also include exploitation in terms of licensing-
out or technology transfer, i.e. knowledge export. Therefore, their relation man-
agement skills play an important role.  
Expert Promoter Perspective 
Expert promoters (EP, n=4) are representatives of the MD companion research 
who are knowledge manager. Their role is to gain a better understanding of the 
innovation system around MD and to share this knowledge in an agile manner 
predominantly with GK who then have the role to further spread this information.  
Adopter Perspective 
Adopter (AD, n=2) allow user-centric system development and contribute highly 
valuable information. Therefore, they are closely related to TP and MP to influ-
ence usability and diffusion of innovation, respectively. 
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Market Promoter Perspective 
Market promoters (MP, n=2) could be also described as market-related relation-
ship promoters as introduced by Gemünden and co-workers (2007). Usually, they 
have good relationships to adaptors of innovation, but also to power promoters. 
Their role is to identify and address barriers of implementing new solutions.  
Power Promoter Perspective 
Power promoters (PO, n=2) have “necessary hierarchical power to drive the pro-
ject, to provide needed resources, and to help to overcome any obstacles that 
might arise during the course of the project” (Gemünden et al., 2007). Thus, PO 
are usually in top-management position within an organization. In general, PO 
are expected to help innovations gaining “momentum”. This includes also protec-
tion of innovations from hazardous environments.  
External Perspective 
Externals (XT, n=3) include individuals who came in contact with MD at least once 
via different channels. All of them are active in the field of near-patient testing. 
XT-I is a knowledge manager from an academic institute (social science) and 
could also be designated as external expert promoter. The focus of XT-I is on 
mobile health and on implementation of near-patient diagnostics in rural settings 
of Germany. XT-II is from an SME and could be also designated as external mar-
ket promoter. XT-III is from a start-up and could be also designated as external 
power promoter.  
Process Promoter Perspective 
The so-called process promoter (PP, n=1) was introduced by Hauschildt and 
Kirchmann (2001) as an actor with “diplomatic skills” who “knows how to ap-
proach and win over different types of people”. PP allows bridging between tech-
nology and power promoter and functions as technology transferor. PP knows 
how to establish houses of innovation and how to connect these with the external 
environment. In this thesis, PP represents an expert of technology cooperation 
with excellence in clustering and networking whose aim is to foster innovation-
friendly environments. PP was not directly involved in MD and was included as 
external innovation expert.  
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Role of the researcher 
The researcher could be described as market promoter and has been working for 
a biotech firm that was partner in one of the biggest MD project. In October 2012, 
the researcher came in contact with MD and was involved in several activities 
driven by expert promoters even after official termination of initiative MD, e.g. a 
work group on requirements for near patient testing. During a period of about four 
years within the environment of MD, the researcher made acquaintance with all 
externals as well as technology, market, power, and expert promoters. Four of 
the six gatekeepers as well as the process promoter were not known to the re-
searcher.  
3.3 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Data analysis was performed as framework approach in analogy to Gale and col-
leagues (Gale et al., 2013). However, analysis was done by a single researcher 
(MH) and manually only – not software-assisted. Audio-recordings from semi-
structured interviews (n=23) were listened before transcription, which allows a 
better immersion with the content. In parallel, emerging thoughts during listening 
were noted down by the researcher. Afterwards recordings were transcribed ver-
batim, except that word replications as well as specific German filling words were 
removed (“also”, “eben”, “ja”, “halt”, and “so”). In addition, sequences not related 
to MD, were cut. All persons, organizations, and locations directly related to MD 
were blinded (i.e. person A, B, C). In total, more than 100 pages of textual data 
were obtained in German language. These are presented in a supplementary 
printed booklet. On request, this can be reviewed by contacting the researcher.  
Textual data were reviewed regarding key themes: Themes related to actors’ ex-
periences of innovating within the network-based approach. Remarkable text se-
quences were highlighted and coded. Codes and related sequences were ex-
tracted from the text and transferred to an Excel Spreadsheet. Extracted se-
quences were translated into English language. This was performed for each ac-
tor (perspective). Then, codes were cross-reviewed. Some codes were merged 
together and those which did not make sense after iterative reviewing (3 cycles) 
were excluded. In a next stage, a matrix of key themes was prepared by linking 
different perspectives (→Table 7). Themes included potential barriers in imple-
menting decentralized diagnostics as addressed by MD expert promoters as well 
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as emergent themes. Themes were analyzed with respect to differences or con-
cordances between perspectives of MD actors. Subsequently, interpretation of 
findings was embedded into the theoretical framework. 
Table 7 Framework of qualitative data analysis 
# Theme Target / Focus 
1 Barriers of Innovation  Technological barriers 
 Regulatory barriers 
 Organizational barriers (silos) 
 Financial barriers (valley of death) 
2 Innovation Management  Uncertainty and Foresight  
 Visionary leadership 
3 Networking & Collaboration  Knowledge management (socialization, 
knowledge transfer and sharing) 
 Interdisciplinary team work  
4 Diffusion / Implementation  Market Access 
 Technology push versus market pull 
 Innovation selling (creating awareness) 
5 Innovation-friendly environment  Willingness-to-innovate 
3.4 Quality of Data 
This study is intended to provide an objective case analysis of the network-based 
innovation approach started within the initiative MD. Therefore, different perspec-
tives were included in the interviews to get a valid basis for data interpretation. 
Moreover, data were collected from actors in private and public institutions as 
well as industry. At least two interview partner were selected for each perspective 
to reduce subjectivity. However, risk of bias cannot be elucidated because not all 
participants of initiative MD were included: E.g. only six coordinators – gatekeep-
ers – were interviewed, although 11 projects were funded. Thus, perspectives of 
about half of the gatekeepers are not available.  
Another source of bias is represented by the researcher itself due to involvement 
in MD as knowledge worker of one industry partner. Notably, the researcher is 
not an experienced qualitative researcher, such as MD expert promoters. There-
fore, interviews could be influenced by non-professional manner of questioning. 
In addition, categorization of data was performed by one researcher only (MH). 
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Thus, there was no cross reviewing by further researchers or verification by ap-
plying software-assisted qualitative data analysis (QDA).  
Finally, it has to be noted that QDA as non-standardized research method cannot 
eliminate subjective elements completely. This is due to the specific fingerprint of 
the researcher and storyteller who looks at the specific case from its own per-
spective.  
Results 
 
37 
4 Results 
Within initiative Mobile Diagnostics (MD), problem and one potential solution 
were pre-defined as high priority challenge by BMBF1. Problem is the demo-
graphic change associated with an increasing number of the elderly (>65 years). 
This is expected to result in higher healthcare expenditure as well as shortage in 
care in rural areas of Germany. Notably, this is not only problematic for Germany, 
but can be considered as global challenge. One potential sub-solution represents 
mobile diagnostics for near patient testing and monitoring.  
Decentralized diagnostics can also be considered as important component of pa-
tient-centered value-based healthcare (VBH; →Figure 10). BMBF initiative MD 
supported the move towards this direction. Aim of MD was to generate knowledge 
in this emerging field: Factors positively and negatively influencing the innovation 
process were to be identified by a multidisciplinary team of knowledge workers 
(expert promoters).  
 
Figure 10 Towards patient-centered healthcare 
MD started in 2011 and was terminated in 2015. Often it is recommended to not 
look back, but into the future. This thesis breaks with it and looks behind. Theo-
retical background information included a foresight model of the Stanford Univer-
sity (SFM, →2.1.3). SFM proposes to start an innovation process with perspec-
tives on lessons learnt. These are crucial for potentially adjusting strategy and to 
develop a long and clear view into the future – foresight. Thus, the new strategy 
is grounded on insights of the past. Perspectives on the case MD were obtained 
                                            
1 BMBF, German Federal Ministry of Education and Research  
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by interviewing a sub-set of actors involved (→Table 8). In case of citations, Eng-
lish translations are used, whereas original sequences in German are included 
as footnotes. The following table helps to get engaged with different actor per-
spectives (see also Table 4): 
Table 8 Actors with roles 
Actor Abbr. Role 
Technology promoter TP System integration: R&D engine of the organization 
Gatekeeper GK Project coordinators: Bridging & knowledge transfer 
Expert promoter EP Generation and transfer of knowledge 
Market promoter MP Market insider and voice of the customer 
Adopter AD Future user: Implementation of innovation 
Power promoter PO Top-Management: Sponsoring / financing of innovation 
Externals XT External innovators in the field of mobile diagnostics  
Process Promoter PP Expert in innovation management and networking 
 
Results presentation refers to selected phases of SFM (→Figure 12: Perspec-
tives and Vision), intertwined with the thesis’ theoretical framework. Starting point 
will be perspectives on barriers of innovation in the field of decentralized diagnos-
tics in German healthcare (→4.1). The first part covers external “hard” factors 
(→4.1.1): Technology and user needs as well as standardization and market ac-
cess. The second part focuses on more internal “soft” influencers of innovation 
environments (→4.1.2). Here, perspectives derive predominantly from individuals 
who were close to the initiative MD (TP, EP, GK, AD), as demonstrated in the 
following figure: 
 
Figure 11 Set-up of innovation network Mobile Diagnostics 
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The last chapter refers to the final phase of SFM (→4.2). It uses insights on per-
spectives ― aha-moments ― for vision creating. Vision shaping is predominately 
based on external perspectives (PO, XT, MP, and PP, presented in black in Fig-
ure 11). This vision is meant to help maneuvering the change strategically to-
wards healthcare innovation in Germany. Focus will be particularly on innovation 
networking and how this can positively influence innovation-friendliness for MD. 
In this context, one perspective – those of the process promoter (PP) – is of par-
ticular importance. Thus, retrospectives (lessons learnt, part I) are used to shape 
the future more actively by networking and by help of external perspectives (stra-
tegic impact, part II). 
 
Figure 12 Structure of results presentation 
4.1 Perspectives: Lessons Learnt 
In agile management procedures, retrospectives are starting point for the next 
sprint. These are meant not meant to be for the project, but for the team – to allow 
improvement of collaboration. Within MD retrospectives based on separately con-
ducted interviews, the researcher tried to identify such insights for which the term 
“aha”-effect or aha-moment was used. Lessons learnt require a dialogue between 
all actors involved. In the following, a dialogue is started artificially by collaging 
interviews with participants of initiative MD. 
4.1.1 External Barriers of Innovation  
Development of in vitro diagnostics is embedded in a complex environment of 
technical standards and regulatory requirements which ensure a high standard 
of quality and safety. For novel decentralized diagnostic systems, there was a 
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lack of requirements and standards (e.g. IT connectivity) prior to initiative MD. 
Gaps were addressed within MD by including users and other important stake-
holders into knowledge generation.  
Technology Push Versus Market Pull 
Decentralized diagnostics are not new, but in use for decades. Established near-
patient tests are using mainly a technology termed as lateral flow. Pregnancy 
home tests are using this technology which allows easy and fast results genera-
tion. However, there are limitations in test performance, at least for some param-
eter, such as infectious agents or small amounts of cancer-specific biomarkers. 
Molecular technologies can result in higher detection rates (sensitivity) and thus, 
can be more adequate to diagnose specific diseases reliably. In this thesis, next 
generation mobile diagnostics using integrated molecular detection technologies 
are in focus.  
Expert promoters within MD found that more than a hundred R&D teams develop 
next generation mobile diagnostics world-wide. Hot-spot is in the USA. One major 
reference platform – already in market in 2012 – was GeneXpert of US company 
Cepheid1. This reference system is not portable (mobile) and time-to-result is 
about 60 min which may not be fast enough for generating actionable results.  
What is fast? The answer is technology-driven. During MD, there were two re-
markable events in 2014: Launch of a molecular system termed Alere i (Alere, 
USA)2 and acquisition of US company Iquum by F. Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche, 
CH)3. Both (to be-) acquired technologies reduced time-to-result of molecular ap-
plications significantly, namely from about 60 min to less than 30 min.  
In addition, both systems are available in relatively small formats – not yet mobile, 
but they allow near patient testing, e.g. in physician office labs. Therefore, these 
technologies made an important move from hospital to more decentralized set-
tings, including envisioned integrated practice units (Figure 10). The lower left 
end of the triangle – added value with respect to cost-efficiently – remains a hur-
dle: Integrated test reagents are still about three times more expensive compared 
                                            
1 Acquired by US group Danaher for 4 billion US dollars in 2016 
2 US company Abbott initiated acquisition of Alere in 2016, but the case is still open 
3 Transfer costs amounted to 450 million US dollars, including upfront and milestone payments 
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to centralized testing. This is where innovators can have a significant impact 
(→4.2.1.). 
Since initiative MD is not insulated, these moves need to be observed carefully 
to adapt innovation strategies proactively: If innovators come up with a system 
requiring more than 30 min, competitiveness must be visible somewhere else. 
For time-critical parameters within a test-and-treat patient management, a rela-
tively low speed could be the game out. TP who are responsible for system inte-
gration risk to get insulated. GK have the important function to set TP back to 
reality.  
Reality is not the hundreds of MD innovators, but the five that could hurt a lot. 
Therefore, the technology landscape prepared by MD expert promoters was very 
helpful for all coordinators of collaborative development projects, namely GK. 
With respect to the highly dynamic and changing environment one GK suggested:  
“[…] such a status quo prepared there [in MD] is certainly good and useful, but I 
think that it should be continued or updated.”1 
In parallel to MD, companies like Iquum and Alere demonstrated that further de-
centralization of molecular testing is possible. Actors of MD had different perspec-
tives on the challenge of system integration and project outcome. One GK em-
phasized that a final product was clearly envisioned: 
“Sure – this was to 100% my motivation to start the whole thing.”2 
One TP, by contrast, considered the approach more as demonstration of tech-
nical feasibility, with a running prototype as output: 
“There are two types of companies that participate in such funded projects: Those 
that […] use the resources to support their strategic development […] and those 
that believe that at the end there will be a product and that they will supply one 
component of this blockbuster, which is a classical erroneous assumption.”3 
                                            
1 „[…] so ein Status Quo, der da [in MD] erarbeitet wurde, [ist] sicher gut und auch sinnvoll, aber 
ich denke, man müsste das natürlich auch weitermachen oder aktualisieren.“ 
2 „Na klar, das war 100% meine Motivation, das ganze Ding zu starten.“ 
3 „[…] es gibt zwei Arten von Firmen, die an solchen Förderprojekten teilnehmen: Die einen, […] 
die Mittel einfach nutzen, um ihre strategische Entwicklung abzufedern […] die andere Art von 
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Regulatory and Quality Affairs: Much Ado 
In the last phase of MD, it was obvious that a new EU regulatory guideline for in 
vitro diagnostics (IVD) will be launched. Particularly regulation of near patient 
testing will change significantly, i.e. regulatory hurdles will be higher in the future. 
Consequently, expert promoter activities addressing gaps in the regulatory envi-
ronments were of high and for some GK of highest interest. Standardization ac-
tivities of EP did not only influence MD innovators. Accordingly, quality compliant 
development has also highest priority for the start-up of an XT: 
“First we introduce 13485 compliant quality management step by step as basis 
for subsequent CE IVD marking”.1 
One adopter observed in industrial partners an extreme focus on legal affairs:  
“It was surprising for me how penetrated it was that everywhere were seen liability 
risks and such things. Not in all, but in many [firms].”2 
4.1.2 Internal Barriers of Innovation 
Innovation Management 
Solid Houses of Innovations ― strategically integrated and actively lived innova-
tion management ― could not be identified. This was independent from size (S, 
M and L) of organizations included. Innovations are rather maneuvered through 
a process which has been established somehow over time. One industrial TP 
mentioned that innovation comes as a “package”, in this case package MD trans-
ferred to consortium Z by BMBF. 
For larger publicly listed firms, a challenge of establishing innovation manage-
ment represent quarterly reports, with financial data directly linked to share value. 
Although shareholder value thinking is expected to shift towards a mid-term or 
even long-term strategy for sustainable growth, a PO pointed out that: 
                                            
Firmen, die gehen halt fest davon aus, dass da am Schluss ein Produkt steht und sie eine 
Komponente zu diesem Blockbuster liefern. Und das ist halt eine klassische Fehlannahme.“ 
1 „Wir wollen / oder sind langsam dabei, erst mal ein Qualitätsmanagement nach 13485 bei uns 
peu à peu einzuführen, um da eine Basis zu haben, um nachher ein CE IVD Kennzeichnung 
anzubringen“ 
2 „Das hat mich gewundert, wie das schon durchgedrungen ist, dass überall Haftungsrisiken ge-
sehen werden und ja solche Sachen. Nicht bei allen, aber bei vielen [Firmen]. 
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“[…] there are internal resistances, which are always the same: “I am already 
occupied. Do I really need that?” And this is a perspective which is just quarterly-
driven [...] and, of course, this makes innovation management requiring money 
and time ― time in form of resources ― difficult.”1 
Therefore, SME and start-ups are regarded as engine of innovation – at least 
from the perspective of the PO. These engines can be incorporated by larger 
players, if the moment in time is right and if the target is in market already (see 
next chapter). This is demonstrated by the acquisitions mentioned above.  
With respect to some smaller MD innovators, one adopter had the impression 
that… 
“[…] there was absolutely no desire for bringing the product to market, instead, 
to follow the strategy to get bought by one of the really big player that in turn 
brings it to market.”2 
Both behaviors – wait-and-buy and wait-and-get-bought – are negatively interfer-
ing with innovation management.  
Technology Transfer: Gimme 5 
Although financial affairs were not included in the work package of EP, it repre-
sented one of the highest hurdles for innovators. One important task of actors 
was to present a plan for technology transfer at the end of MD. If this step is 
successful and in time, it can help to overcome the “valley of death” (→Figure 
13). Technology transfer was a challenge for most actors, independent from their 
background (small or medium private or public organizations). One option is to 
transfer the prototype to a (larger) company. This is difficult according to a GK 
who made the experience that: 
                                            
1 „Es ist eher, dass die internen Widerstände da sind, die immer die gleichen sind: Ich bin schon 
beschäftigt; brauche ich das wirklich? Und das ist eine Sichtweise, die einfach Quartals-getrie-
ben ist, oder sagen wir mal, die short-term ist […] Und das macht natürlich Innovationsmanage-
ment, wenn es Geld und Zeit kostet — und Zeit eben auch in Form von Ressourcen —, schwie-
rig.“ 
2 „[…] es geht überhaupt nicht darum, das Produkt jetzt wirklich selber bis zum in den Markt zu 
bringen, sondern die Strategie irgendwann sich aufkaufen zu lassen von einem sehr ganz Gro-
ßen und dann würden sie das dann in den Markt bringen.“ 
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“[…] most [companies] looking for it [mobile diagnostics] want something practi-
cally marketable.”1 
 
Figure 13 Overcoming the valley of death. Adapted from: Künzel, Meier zu Köcker and Köhler, 
2016 
This is also reflected by above mentioned acquisitions of biggest players in the 
field of near patient testing, namely Abbott, Danaher, and Roche: All acquisition 
targets were in market and generated significant revenue already. Acquirers did 
not want to take the risk of microsystem integration and wait until market readi-
ness. In contrast to private firms, listed companies strongly depend on the behav-
ior of their shareholders who want return of investment – the sooner, the better. 
Share values are a promise for the future and for some GK a prisoner’s dilemma, 
where from PO perspective… 
“[…] publicly listed firms tend to buy rather than build, if this firm [target] is able to 
come up with revenue immediately, because it is already in market or two years 
ahead with technology compared to a potential internal one”2 
                                            
1„[…] dass die meisten [Firmen], die zwar danach [Mobile Diagnostik] gucken, was haben wollen, 
was praktisch schon marktreif ist.“ 
2 „[…] wo bei Public gelisteten Firmen die Nadel eher in Richtung buy geht als build, wenn denn 
diese Firma [Target] in der Lage ist, sofort dann entsprechend auch mit Umsatz aufzuwarten, 
weil sie vielleicht auch schon im Markt drin ist, oder weil sie bei der Technologie zwei Jahre 
weiter ist als eine mögliche interne Entwicklung.“ 
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Consequently, technologies not meeting these criteria risk to be rejected or put 
on standby, i.e. wait-buy-eventually mode. Very recently, in December 2016, Ger-
man Start-up Carpegen sold1 its mobile molecular diagnostics technology2 to Cu-
retis (not yet publicly listed firm located in Germany). The running prototype was 
in parts developed within MD. Thus, transfer was successful in this case, with the 
technology being made market-ready within the next years. 
Technology readiness is, of course, not the only determinant for make-or-buy 
decision-making. It depends on the market segment as well. If the market tar-
geted is relatively unknown to the firm3, then PO’s anticipation is as follows: 
“Before building it internally including know-how – which is with respect to tech-
nology not incremental –, publicly listed firms would rather move towards M&A”4 
Thus, MD innovators should start a dialogue with as many firms as possible, in-
cluding not publicly listed firms, like those of the German Mittelstand. However, 
the network should go beyond Germany. This insight is not new. However, the 
impact could be improved. The example shows that implementation of tacit 
knowledge – in this case experience in finding the right partner – can be chal-
lenging. Like in private life, there is risk to get blinded by beauty or in this case: 
Power. Notably, PO are in general very smart and it may not be easy to look 
behind the curtain as they usually like to ploy. Nevertheless, there are few ques-
tions which can be posed and which may provide a hint, whether further engage-
ment is worth, as also recommended by the PO: 
“In general, an interested party [transferor] should use questioning, probing to 
figure out what one really needs. If they don’t do it – I am now very open and 
direct –, then it is their own fault.”5 
                                            
1 Upfront payment was 5 million Euro 
2 Human diagnostics-related applications 
3 In case of mobile diagnostics e.g. not laboratory professionals in centralized settings, but gen-
eral practitioner in physician offices 
4 Bevor ich das intern aufbaue inklusive Know-how – und das ist sozusagen nicht etwas, was von 
der Technologie her eine Fortentwicklung dessen ist, was man kennt – dann geht die Nadel 
eher bei Public gelisteten Firmen in Richtung M&A. 
5 In der Regel sollte ein Interessent [Transferor] versuchen, über Fragen über Probing herauszu-
finden, was man wirklich braucht. Wenn die es nicht tun – da bin ich jetzt mal ganz offen und 
direkt – sind sie selber schuld. 
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In private life, one question may be: “Do you like cats?”. With respect to a poten-
tial professional partner and in context to its specific build-buy-borrow strategy, 
questions related to sales channels can be useful. If the potential partner is more 
marketing driven (pull) rather than R&D driven (push), the focus of probing may 
not be on technology. Companies can be pull-push in-balanced. Therefore, the 
drive can be relatively dynamic. For fast and efficient screening of potential inno-
vation partners SFM proposes the tool “Buddy Check”. As presented in Figure 
14, promoters of innovation can bring new solution to the next level, if innovators 
know how to play the game. Buddy Checks can help to identify new team mem-
bers, complementing skills needed for innovation. Moreover, they can help to 
better cope with real-world situations in which an emergent solution can be con-
fronted e.g. with PO or opponents of innovation. This confrontation can be as 
simple as the question: Do I really need it? Thus, the transferor should not only a 
good seller but ideally also a good buyer to strategically project the other party. 
One additional remark of the PO regarding probing (Buddy Check) is: 
“It is, of course, fact that we do not disclose everything which is strategically im-
portant to us. It is like purchasing: If there is one interested party that absolutely 
wants to achieve something, then this party is, of course, always a little bit more 
open compared to the other, asking itself: Do I really need it?”1 
 
 
Figure 14 Buddy Checks: Getting to the next level with promoters of innovation. Adapted from 
Carleton et al., 2013 
                                            
1 „Dass wir natürlich nicht alles preisgeben, was strategisch für uns wichtig, ist natürlich auch ein 
Fakt. Das ist wie beim Kauf: Wenn es einen Interessenten gibt, der unbedingt etwas erreichen 
möchte, dann ist der natürlich immer etwas offener als derjenige, der sich fragt: Brauche ich das 
eigentlich? 
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Another fact is that industries have a specific pace of innovation. This pace can 
lack considerably behind those of smaller organizations, such as start-ups. In this 
case the transferor will face difficulties in selling a solution or in creating demand 
for it. It may be observed that a potential transferee starts to play for some level, 
but slows down after a while. From PO perspective (Figure 14, level 3)… 
“that’s the keep-it-warm philosophy. These are the interesting ones [technologies] 
which cannot be promoted within the organization at that moment in time, but of 
which one is personally convinced that they would be beneficial for the com-
pany.”1 
Consequently, transferors need to be patient when dealing with companies pre-
senting with a slow pace of innovation. An alternative to “get bought” or “buy” is 
“make”. As stated in the introduction, voices of the industry estimate about five 
years and an investment of about 50 million US dollars required for financing of 
regulatory compliant mobile diagnostics system integration (Morel et al., 2016). 
For one TP, even a tenth of this amount could bridge the gap, but:  
„[…] somebody coming along and saying, 'I give you 5 million and you do product 
development including documentation for conformity declaration', did simply not 
happen. The barrier is certainly more a financial one […]”.2 
This was confirmed by a GK: “In general, we have this financing issue here. Ger-
many is not such a liquid market compared to the American one.”3 
The factor of 10 in-between 5 and 50 is in this case not a moon shot, but a financ-
ing gap: Prototype versus product launch. In this context, an experienced GK 
stressed: 
                                            
1 „Das ist die Keep-it-warm-Philosophie. Das sind so die Interessanten [Technologien], die aber 
momentan irgendwie in der Organisation schlecht zu vertreten sind, von den man persönlich 
überzeugt ist, dass sie der Firma guttun würden“ 
2 „[…] dass jemand kommt und sagt, „Ich gebe euch jetzt 5 Millionen und ihr macht eine Produkt-
entwicklung drauf mit der Dokumentation, die man dann für die Konformitätserklärung benötigt“, 
das ist einfach nicht passiert. Die Hürde ist mit Sicherheit eher eine finanzielle […]“ 
3 „Wir [haben] generell dieses Finanzierungs-Problem hier. Deutschland ist nicht so ein liquider 
Markt wie der amerikanische zum Beispiel.“ 
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“Most founders are naïve and underestimate the effort which follows. What they 
also underestimate is the conservatism of the market. It is not that all people are 
waiting for point of care [mobile diagnostics].”1 
With respect to potential financing issues mentioned above, it is important to note 
that out-of-the-box corporate venture capitalists (VC) emerge: VC having a weak 
or non-biomedtech background, but considering healthcare as new sector. With 
respect to out-of-the-box VC one XT who benefited from this move explained 
that…  
“they invest as corporate investors to get familiar with new sectors via these start-
ups.”2 
Prioritization: Baby Steps 
Among MD actors, GK played the most important role in terms of networking: 
Because of their function as project coordinators they were first contacts of 
knowledge worker (EP).  
Knowledge generation and networking was acknowledged by all GK, whereas 
active engagement was restricted to a sub-set of actors. One EP had expected 
more activity in terms of networking: 
“We offer it [knowledge generation] and if people don’t react, then we continue 
with those who are engaged. That’s it. After all, it was voluntary.”3 
Potential reasons for relatively low engagement can be diverse. For GK, highest 
priority is on financing, followed by technology (Figure 15): First deficits, then 
growth. This can result in a dilemma, at least from EP perspective: 
„I believe that regarding barriers of innovation there is simply a certain naivety, I 
have to say, in one or the other […]: It is taken care of financiers, offices […], 
                                            
1 Die meisten Gründer sind naiv und unterschätzen den Aufwand, der dann kommt. Und was sie 
auch unterschätzen, ist der Konservativismus im Markt. Es ist ja nicht so das die Leute jetzt alle 
auf Point of Care warten [mobile Diagnostik]. 
2 […] dass sie als Corporate Investor investieren, um über diese Start-ups etwas über neue Bran-
chen kennen zu lernen. 
3 „Klar, wir bieten das an, und wenn die Leute nicht darauf reagieren, dann machen Sie mit denen 
weiter, die sich engagieren. Das ist ganz klar. Das ist ja auch freiwillig gewesen.“ 
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while they often forget that in a regulated market one has to address, e.g. regu-
lation.”1 
 
Figure 15 Activities within Mobile Diagnostics in relation to Maslow (1943) 
 
Networking was meant to be established in a sustainable manner, with continuing 
activities after termination of MD in 2015. Until today, there are indeed activities 
in the network set up within MD. Post-MD, activities were restricted to a small 
subset of actors. One GK explained:  
„Apart from regulatory affairs / registration, where one colleague is involved […] 
we are actually more passive with respect to the network and take care of the 
follow-up project.”2 
Moving on is here the maxim. Thus, some left the MD community due to shifting 
of priorities, while others joined.  
Major networking platform set-up within MD is an (bi-) annual event termed “Mo-
bile Diagnostics at Point of Care” (MD-POC). MD-POC is generally highly fre-
quented and planned to be continued, according to EP. In addition, there were 
several different workshops in MD, where particularly one that addresses real 
world laboratory medicine will also be continued, because return on investment 
has been demonstrated. Both formats went beyond MD, inviting explicitly exter-
nals as well. One external who joined the MD community in 2015 (late phase) via 
                                            
1 „Ich glaube, dass, was die Innovationshürden angeht, schlichtweg einfach da eine gewisse Na-
ivität, muss ich mal sagen, auch bei dem einem oder anderen […] vorhanden ist: D.h. da wird 
sich um Geldgeber gekümmert, um Büroräume […] nur sie vergessen dann häufig, dass in 
einem regulierten Markt, man sich eben mit den Regularien, zum Beispiel, auseinandersetzen 
muss.“ 
2 „Regulatory Affairs / Zulassung, da wirkt an der einen oder anderen Stelle unser Kollege mal 
noch mit […] ansonsten sind wir da, was jetzt dieses Netzwerk angeht, tatsächlich eher passiv 
unterwegs und kümmern uns um das Nachfolgeprojekt.“ 
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MD-POC was included in the interview. From this external perspective, motiva-
tion to join was not only to share knowledge and to make contacts, but: 
“[…] of course, to be able to influence a little bit or to have the possibility to influ-
ence as small and medium enterprise”1  
Another motivation as strong driver for network engagement was curiosity in case 
of one AD: 
“I was personally interested in getting familiar with the industry perspective”.2 
Thus, it seems that both individuals (AD and XT) have a clear intrinsic motivation. 
Moreover, it seems that these individuals – innovators – who are not predomi-
nately occupied with financial affairs are more open regarding networking in com-
parison to GK.  
4.2 Vision: Towards Value-based Healthcare 
“Without a vision, groups can survive, but they can’t expect to achieve greatness.” 
This could be another remark of one PO, but it cites SFM playbook (Carleton et 
al., 2013). Important actors in MD like PO do not want to see good, but great 
ideas. If one is lucky, good ideas may be handled as KIW ― keep it warm ―, but 
often it is put on hold or closed, together with about 90% of other good ideas. 
Game over. Thus, innovation management needs a strategy, including a vision 
statement. The willingness-to-innovate can be influenced positively by a strong 
vision. In this context, one GK reflected: 
“Maybe that was what was missing: Simply the target and market associated. 
That we were unaware what we can achieve, when we make it [MD innovation]. 
What the potential revenues really are. […] We knew that it is a sensible move 
we make, but we did not really have a business case.”3 
                                            
1 „[…] dass man natürlich da als kleines mittelständisches Unternehmen auch ein bisschen Ein-
flussnahme hat oder die Möglichkeit zur Einflussnahme.“ 
2 „Für mich ging's vor allen Dingen darum, aus persönlichem Interesse, die Hersteller-Seite ken-
nen zu lernen“. 
3 “Vielleicht hat uns auch das gefehlt: Einfach das Ziel und den Markt hinten dran. Das uns einfach 
nicht bewusst war, was wir schaffen können, wenn wir das [MD Innovation] schaffen, was das 
wirklich für ein Umsatz ist. […] Wir wussten, das ist eine sinnvolle Geschichte, die wir da entwi-
ckeln, aber wir hatten nicht wirklich einen Business Case.” 
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PO can easily list characteristics of good visions: Ambitious, wise – to include 
Nonaka – idealistic, credible, realistic, tangible, etc. With respect to tangible, a 
bad, but real example of a vision is as follows: “We will be market leader in 5 
years”. This is indeed ambitious, however: How? Where to put energy? This ex-
ample does not include a direction for activities. It is correct that a vision should 
be simple, but in an idealistic or wise manner.  
An example vision statement goes beyond Germany to UK: Start-up QuantuMDx 
founded in 2008. Focus is also on development of mobile molecular diagnostics 
using a radical innovation approach. It could collect a significant amount of 
money, demonstrating that obviously, the team sold its technology effectively by 
communicating a vision. The latter was accessed from the company’s homepage, 
February 15, 2017, and is as follows: 
“QuantuMDx is dedicated to improving and democratising global health by provid-
ing transformative diagnostic tools to overburdened healthcare systems.” 
Even though creating of a vision sounds simple, it is not. Tools such as SFM can 
help to create a vision that can be diffused easily and within a minute. A vision 
may not only be important for single organizations, but can positively influence 
the power of a network (→4.2.2). 
A vision is of importance and helps to market a great idea successfully, thereby 
turning it into innovation. With respect to science marketing, German biotech 
start-ups could benefit from a little bit more self-confidence. It seems that some 
German entrepreneurs feel uncomfortable, if external data drift too far away from 
the confidential status quo. One entrepreneurial XT noted with respect to “over 
selling”:  
“There must be somehow still a healthy balance: At the one end of the spectrum, 
serving as negative example, is Theranos1. At the other end are German devel-
opers who […] may have super great technologies, but developed for too long in 
                                            
1 A US company that had a very good far reaching idea (paradigm shift in laboratory diagnostic 
testing), which turned out to be not actionable (see below, DARPA Hard Test I) and IV)) 
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the ivory tower without attracting attention and who then complain about not get-
ting any money.”1 
4.2.1 DARPA Hard Test: Sustainable Competition 
The reason why SFM was put into play is not only because it emphasizes on 
vision, but also because it targets more radical rather than incremental innova-
tion. Foresight targets emergent growth.  
Why DARPA? DARPA is the US Defense and Advance Research Project Agency 
and is of interest in the context of MD because some technologies started in mil-
itary research: For example, former US company Biofire2 developed its rapid mo-
lecular diagnostic system initially for biothreat applications, i.e. the detection of 
hazardous material such as Bacillus anthracis. Notably, one technology devel-
oped within MD started in this field as well. DARPA usually works on challenging 
complex projects like MD, which are defined by DARPA program managers as 
follows: 
I) Far reaching ― paradigm shift, e.g. healthcare as integrated practice unit, 
impacting not only a single, but many individuals  
II) Technically challenging ― e.g. integration of microsystem components 
III) Multidisciplinary ― e.g. physicists, software engineers, optoelectronics, me-
chanical engineers, molecular biologists, clinicians, nurses, etc. 
IV) Actionable ― e.g. vision can be followed not only theoretically, but practi-
cally 
These four dimensions can help to characterize the innovation targeted. During 
the dialogue with MD innovators it was found that understanding of innovation 
differs. Even if radical innovation is not targeted, it is helpful to discriminate it from 
a radical innovation and to handle it accordingly. This is important, since depend-
                                            
1 Es muss irgendwo trotzdem noch eine gesunde Balance da sein. Am anderen Ende des Spekt-
rums, was als negativ Beispiel dienen kann, ist Theranos. Das andere Ende sind deutsche Ent-
wickler, die […] vielleicht super tolle Technologien haben, haben aber viel zu lange im Elfen-
beinturm entwickelt und nicht auf sich aufmerksam gemacht und dann darüber schimpfen, dass 
sie kein Geld bekommen. 
2 Acquired by French diagnostic firm BioMérieux in 2013 for 450 million US dollars  
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ing on the innovation targeted, different strategies for diffusion are to be consid-
ered. More radical innovation (moon shots, 10x) may require a completely differ-
ent communication platform. Thus, change is maneuvered differently.  
To discriminate radical from incremental, an external innovator and entrepreneur 
(XT) was interviewed as well. XT’s perspective showed that technologies going 
beyond existing knowledge on technology can suffer from alienation, even in rel-
atively innovation-friendly environments, such as academic institutions: 
“Unfortunately, technology was – why only unfortunately? – it was fairly new, even 
at university. By using standard university research, it would have been impossi-
ble to obtain a high degree of maturity. Therefore, we had to raise a lot of capital”1 
This exemplifies that in case of radical technology innovation ― doing something 
not as usual, but out-of-the-box in 5 min instead of 60 min or more (10x) ― there 
is a significant gap between invention (maybe), prototyping (likely) and product 
development (very likely). Notably, major challenge is to marry this technology 
with an application that allows demonstration of value added (actionable). 
The Challenge: Targeting Value Innovation  
Kim and Mauborgne (2004) focus since many years on strategic innovation man-
agement and proposed the so-called Blue Ocean Strategy. Here, one important 
discrimination from the “dominant” strategy (Red Ocean Strategy) is to break with 
the value-cost trade-off. This strategy and the DARPA Hard Test help to evaluate 
innovation activities in MD. For this purpose, a benchmark system is used as 
pioneer or first mover.  
Reliable test results (performance) can be regarded as hygienic factor (must 
have): Physicians would not accept a technology that does not reliably support 
clinical decision making. This was confirmed by one external expert promoter 
(XT) who focuses on implementation of mobile diagnostics and mHealth applica-
tions in Germany: 
                                            
1 „Leider war die Technologie – was heißt leider? – sie ist so neu gewesen, dass sie auch an der 
Uni noch recht frisch war. Und dass man nicht durch reine Uniforschung schon zu einem großen 
Reifegrad hätte gelangen können. Deswegen mussten wir einfach auch sehr viel Kapital auf-
nehmen.” 
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“[interviewed physicians] would only use such a system, if it generates robust 
results.”1 
Thus, if a system has poor sensitivity, then high false negative rates would force 
to do confirmatory laboratory testing, resulting in higher rather than lower overall 
costs. This could be observed in Germany and other countries for first generation 
lateral flow (strip) devices testing for one pathogen that causes sexually transmit-
ted disease, i.e. Chlamydia trachomatis. Detection rates were demonstrated to 
be poor in larger studies (about 40% sensitivity). Although this is about a decade 
ago, such near patient devices still have a “quick-and-dirty” stigma which is hard 
to eradicate. Next to sensitivity, specificity is evaluated: If it is poor, then the false 
positive rate would be inacceptable due to a risk of potential overtreatment. The 
latter would be contraindicative with respect to treatment with antibiotics.  
Back to the benchmark system, marketed as sensitive, specific, and easy to use: 
Selected pioneer is liat (lab-in-a-tube; Roche, CH). It follows the value-based pric-
ing strategy: Laboratory-like performance with a pricing 3-4 times higher com-
pared to centralized testing. However, the test can be done onsite in about 20 
min. Thus, costs for sample shipment and administration are saved. In addition, 
the patient does not need to come back, because of a potential test and treat 
algorithm: Test for dominant respiratory viruses, identify e.g. Influenza A or B 
virus and decide whether to treat with antiviral agents like e.g. Oseltamivir2. Thus, 
the former “espresso cup” business model (recurring revenues per installed base 
through test [espresso] cartridges) is in transition: Diagnostic test results are used 
to support treatment with a specific therapeutic agent. This may ensure future 
pharma revenues as one-stop-shop-solution, even in case of patent expiry of the 
agent. 
Figure 16 exemplifies the challenge in targeting moon shots or blue oceans. It is 
a mix of reduced and adapted DARPA Hard Test and Blue Ocean Strategy. Here, 
it is used to highlight potential gaps addressed in the following chapter (→4.2.2). 
One strategy could be to imitate liat as fast follower, indicated by the solid arrow 
termed Red. This can be done by decreasing test price and/or speed, whereas 
                                            
1 „[Ärzte] würden so ein System nur nutzen, wenn es auch belastbare Ergebnisse liefert“ 
2 Therapeutic agent provided by Roche as Tamiflu® 
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test performance may be the same, slightly lower or varies more between tests 
performed. A radical (next pioneer) approach, by contrast, is demonstrated by the 
broken arrow termed Blue in Figure 16. This is the extreme – solutions can also 
be in-between red and blue.  
 
Figure 16 Example for radical MD innovation. In relation to DARPA Hard Test and Blue Ocean 
Strategy 
With respect to diffusion of innovation, a bluer solution that can cut costs is ex-
pected to have higher impact and allows a broad distribution of mobile diagnos-
tics, even under the tree as envisaged by the QuantuMDx team. Costs are not 
only critical in low and middle income countries, but also in Germany, as found 
by studies involving XT: 
“Costs are the main risk factor, followed by a certain skepticism towards technol-
ogy”.1 
A solution with value-cost trade-off is envisioned by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, investing significantly in decentralized diagnostics. Funding was 
granted to bigger publicly listed player and smaller organizations, amongst others 
Alere (US) and Quidel (US), respectively. However, cutting costs by maintaining 
performance has not been achieved so far. Costs can be mainly traced back to 
expensive cartridges containing test reagents. Particularly, quality control in reg-
ulated environments can increase costs dramatically. Therefore, not only system 
                                            
1 „Kosten ist der Hauptrisikofaktor und dann kommt schon eine gewisse Skepsis bezüglich der 
Technologie“ 
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development itself is critical, but identification of solutions for cost reduction, e.g. 
by using reagent integrating 3D printing instead of injection molding.  
Friend or Foe? 
It is evident that complex challenges may be more likely to solve in a multidisci-
plinary environment. In this context, new out-of-the-box player can help comple-
ment value creation. One example is German Group Bosch that is not only strong 
in 3D printing and packaging, but has experience in regulated markets (albeit 
automotive), connectivity and system integration. Although this group is already 
active in the field of mobile diagnostics, the market PO does not see severe emer-
gent competition:  
“In the end, they need know-how, meaning a partner with which they can enter 
[the market].”1 
What hurts? More dangerous emergent competition sees the market PO from… 
“firms having today a market leadership role in the field of digitalization. That 
these enter those fields [mobile health], which they already do.“2 
This move was also foreseen from an entrepreneurial XT: 
“[Other player] that do not belong to the known classical molecular diagnostic 
firms penetrate or try out this sector, e.g. Google, Samsung, which interestingly 
also started poaching in other sectors, such as automotive […]. Big classical 
player like Roche and Qiagen target innovations via acquisitions – very expensive 
acquisitions.“3 
                                            
1 „Aber am Ende brauchen Sie auch Know-how. Das heißt sie brauchen auch einen Partner, mit 
dem sie da [in den Markt] reingehen“ 
2 „Gefährlicher halte ich da, ehrlich gesagt, Firmen, die im Bereich Digitalisierung heute eine 
marktführende Rolle haben. Dass die sich in solche Bereiche reinbegeben. Und das tun sie alle 
schon […].“ 
3 „[andere Player], die nicht zu den klassischen bekannten molekularen Diagnostikfirmen gehö-
ren, drängen oder schnuppern in diese Branche hinein, beispielsweise auch Google, Samsung, 
die interessanterweise auch in anderen Branchen anfangen zu wildern, auch zum Beispiel im 
Bereich Automotive. […]. Die ganz großen klassischen Player wie Roche und Qiagen, die su-
chen sich Innovationen durch Übernahmen – durch sehr teure Übernahmen.“ 
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Thus, mobile diagnostics are more than just instruments delivering results or data 
points. It requires service innovation as well. The value to be added and demon-
strated is an actionable result, as addressed in the following chapter. 
4.2.2 Innovation Network Facilitated Diffusion 
“Choose your idea’s most efficient network path to success” (Carleton et al., 
2013, p. 46). Pathfinders is the final tool of SFM. Creation of a sustainable net-
work that help actors to be successful was one major target of initiative MD. This 
thesis aimed at evaluating the impact of network MD on healthcare innovation in 
Germany. Main barriers to implementation of mobile diagnostic systems were to 
be identified. This was based on perspectives of different actors within the inno-
vation network. In this chapter, lessons learnt are used to find a network pathway 
which can disrupt German Healthcare more successful. A process promoter as 
well as expert promoter will serve as pathfinders. 
Main Barriers of Healthcare Innovation 
Within initiative MD expected barriers for implementation of lab-on-a-chip tech-
nologies were addressed by a multidisciplinary team of expert promoter. Barriers 
involved user needs, technology, standardization, regulatory affairs, and market 
access. Expert promoter created valuable knowledge in the field of mobile diag-
nostics transferred in meetings, workshops and events or in form of paper, e.g. 
German Standardization Roadmap Mobile Diagnostic Systems available in Eng-
lish as well (DKE - Roadmap, 2015). Knowledge generated in the field of quality 
and regulatory affairs had highest impact on innovators. It empowered innovators 
with respect to establishment or adaption of harmonized product development 
processes. Notably, this impact could also be identified in external innovators 
who integrated knowledge generated within MD into their organizations. How-
ever, more than a year after official termination of MD, there are still barriers as 
specified by one EP: 
“Everything going towards point-of-care has two hurdles: Reimbursement by the 
insurer as well as sensitivity and specificity. The latter are somehow valued arti-
ficially as bad by diverse people. On the other hand, there are indeed examples 
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in the field of point-of-care testing, especially devices for blood glucose measure-
ments, where significant differences [in test accuracy] occurred. “1 
In theory, solutions for overcoming remaining barriers of healthcare innovation in 
Germany are expected to exist in the network. However, there are hints that in-
novation networking itself represents a hurdle itself which needs to be overcome 
first. 
 
Willingness-to-Innovate 
In this thesis, actors of the innovation network received special roles based on 
the promoter model of Witte (1973). In contrast to this first model, here, more key 
actors were brought into play as a complex multidisciplinary project like MD forces 
various interfaces. Notably, the network driving MD innovation does not only con-
stitute of key promoter, but a gatekeeper who connects to multidisciplinary project 
teams. SFM recommends that these teams cover different characters needed for 
successful innovation management: Pioneer (technology promoter), problem 
solver, analyst, producer, rebel, and pragmatist.  
One important finding is that innovator roles defined by the researcher were not 
fitting adequately. For example, a PO was initially meant to support innovation 
processes by providing resources and integration into the house of innovation. It 
turned out that power regarding internal innovation activities is reduced signifi-
cantly by quarterly reports. In this case the power shifts from build to hunt. In 
parallel, the need for building a solid house of innovation is little as long as share-
holder expect short-midterm return on investment.  
                                            
1 „Alles, was in Richtung Point of Care geht, hat zwei Hürden: Einmal das Reimbursement durch 
den Versicherungsträger und einmal Sensitivität und Spezifität. Die werden irgendwie von di-
versen Leuten künstlich als schlecht bewertet. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es auch Beispiele im 
Point-of-Care Bereich, gerade Blutzuckermessgeräte, wo dann schon eklatante Unterschiede 
[in der Akkuratesse des Tests] aufgetreten sind.“ 
 
Address both “hard” (e.g. technology, regulatory) and “soft” barriers (e.g. 
willingness-to-innovate, bridging) for improving innovation networking 
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Another example are gatekeepers whose role was meant to share, generate and 
transmit knowledge. Some GK fulfilled this role very well. However, there are in-
dications that relevant knowledge has not always reached all members of the 
team. In addition, creation of new knowledge was limited to a subset of actors 
only.  
 
 
In general, networks generated spontaneously by incentives like funding risk of 
staying a plunder community, as pointed out by the PP: 
“Often, there is interest in using these funds and not in following the motto: Where 
is my problem? What are the solutions? And how can I get started? It is more a 
top-down approach.“1 
The motto is rather: Make the job as described by the funder, take the money and 
move on. Often, actors move on without doing lessons learnt involving key actors, 
as described by one EP: 
“There were no reflections. Actually, everyone was happy to deliver papers in 
time and to be conform with work packages and pre-defined project scope, so 
that one could say with a clear conscience: It was worth it supporting us with 
money.”2 
Thus, a main challenge in networking is to take off the blinkers (pre-defined pro-
ject scope) put on by funder like BMBF. Blinker are highly efficient for keeping 
focus on one specific work package – keeping on track, as demonstrated by the 
successful fulfillment of milestones. Therefore, employees of larger firms tend to 
use blinker quite frequently, because their incentives are usually related to some 
                                            
1 „Da ist oftmals das Interesse, diese Fördermittel zu nutzen und nicht nach dem Motto: Wo liegt 
mein Problem? Was gibt es für Lösungen? Und wie kann ich da loslegen? Eher ein Top-down 
Approach.” 
2 „Es gab keine Reflektionen. Eigentlich war jeder froh, dass er seine Arbeitspapiere fristgerecht 
abgeliefert hat, dass man formell den ganzen Arbeitspaketen und dem vordefinierten Projekt-
umfang entsprochen hat. Und dass man mit gutem Gewissen sagen kann: Das Geld war es 
schon wert, dass Ihr [BMBF] uns unterstützt habt.“ 
 
Ensure that each actor empathizes with her or his role and that each key 
character is involved: Rearrange or exchange actors, if necessary. 
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selected milestones. However, in innovation networking activities, blinkers are 
not appropriate: Wearing blinkers does not allow consideration of the whole en-
vironment. If the overall goal is to improve friendliness of innovation environ-
ments, then not only a part of the environment should be considered, but 360°: It 
is important to ask what innovators really need, apart from pre-defined work pack-
ages. In spontaneous plunder communities, this is difficult, as explained by PP: 
“They [actors] won’t do it, because generally they are so much trapped in re-
search that they at first try to fulfill work packages associated with funding.”1 
Retrospectives of innovators showed e.g. that technology transfer / selling is a 
significant hurdle. This was also because identification of partners took mainly 
place in Germany. Technology transfer in and beyond Germany is therefore an 
unmet need. An EP mentioned that a technical design review or process review 
could be helpful for some actors. This is difficult since innovators demonstrated 
to be closed with respect to internal knowledge. Here, network MD faced its bor-
der, demonstrating that this activity must be transferred to a trustful environment, 
such as an exclusive cluster like MicroTEC Südwest, Baden-Württemberg, Ger-
many. Some MD innovators are already in transition. 
One further example for negative effects of wearing blinker was a project running 
nearly in parallel to MD, namely DIA-LOC. DIA-LOC was a multidisciplinary pro-
ject that focused on the implementation of mobile diagnostics by evaluating soci-
oeconomic factors. Even if these initiatives were strategically meant to run sepa-
rately, it would have been valuable for MD actors to benefit from knowledge gen-
erated in DIA-LOC and vice versa. These cross-networking activities can em-
power innovator. 
 
 
                                            
1 „Das machen sie [Akteure] nicht, weil sie dann meistens in der Förderung so gefangen sind, 
dass sie dann erst mal daran arbeiten, die Vorgaben, die mit der Förderung verbunden sind, 
dann umzusetzen.“ 
 
Remove blinkers and use synergies with other networks for allowing creation 
of a larger collective intelligence: Find the path via 360° 
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Who Cares?  
Insights out of MD’s dizygotic twin DIA-LOC would have been interesting for MD 
actors, since market-related hurdles turned out to be highest, as stressed out by 
an EP: 
“The problem is really reimbursement. Reimbursement is the highest hurdle.”1 
Within MD, activities in this field were imbalanced when compared to standardi-
zation of near patient testing. Best practices for health technology assessments 
are an unmet need. 
 
 
George Harry Heilmeier who was director of (D) ARPA in the seventies proposed 
a set of questions – known as Heilmeier Catechism – to be answered by the team 
(Carleton et al., 2013, p. 227). Here, one question is highlighted: 
Who cares? If you're successful, what difference will it make?  
This answer may be easily answered as follows: Mobile diagnostics in rural set-
tings empower clinicians and nurses and add value to patients by maintaining 
high standard healthcare in a cost-efficient manner – not only in Germany, but 
globally. 
Although the answer may be convincing, value added needs to be demonstrated. 
In addition, as proposed by SFM, this vision needs to be communicated to guide 
future activities, involving long-term collaboration of multidisciplinary teams. 
Long-term collaboration can e.g. involve merging of DIA-LOC experts with MD 
EP. 
 
 
                                            
1 „Das Problem ist wirklich Abrechnung. Die Abrechnung ist die größte Hürde.“ 
 
Demonstrate value added by mobile diagnostics, thereby overcoming main 
barriers in healthcare innovation: Market access and performance stigma 
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Pathfinding by Networking  
Implementation of novel mobile diagnostics require intensive change manage-
ment. Success of diffusion of innovation strongly depends on I) relative ad-
vantage, II) compatibility, III) complexity, IV) trialability, and V) observability. 
Characteristics II to IV can be covered quite easily, whereas I and V cannot be 
demonstrated easily: How to demonstrate superiority and impact of mobile diag-
nostics? 
Near patient testing is already widely used. However, it is still restricted to a lim-
ited set of parameter, including cardiac marker, blood glucose, and blood gas 
analysis. Emerging lab-on-a-chip technologies broadening the menu of test pa-
rameter, by contrast, are associated with higher costs per result as compared to 
established classical point-of-care parameter mentioned above. Therefore, reim-
bursement is not an easy pathway ― at least in Germany, as pointed out by the 
market access promoter (MP): 
“Now, an additional hurdle for point-of-care has been set by contractual partners: 
Now, a point-of-care test has to demonstrate that e.g. a faster turnaround time 
has an added value as compared to standard laboratory testing”.1 
 
                                            
1 „Da wurde jetzt noch mal eine zusätzliche Hürde für Point-of-Care von den Vertragspartnern 
aufgemacht: Dass jetzt ein Point-of-Care Test nachweisen muss, dass eine schnellere 
Turnaround Time, zum Beispiel, einen so genannten in Anführungsstrichen Zusatznutzen ge-
genüber dem normalen Labor Test hat.“ 
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Figure 17 Centralized versus decentralized testing. Adapted from: Larsson, Greig-Pylypczuk 
and Huisman, 2015, p. 2 
 Abbreviations: Lab, laboratory; LOC, lab-on-a-chip 
 
If this value added cannot be demonstrated, then the case is rejected. Game 
over. In this case, return on investment is only possible, if innovators were able 
to break the value/cost trade-off. As presented in Figure 17, time-to-result can be 
significantly reduced by a near patient test (right workflow). In case of severe 
illness like sepsis, every minute counts. However, if results are inactionable, be-
cause data generation was not quality controlled and reliable, then these cannot 
be used to support clinical decision making. Users of next generation mobile di-
agnostics (e.g. nurses) often do not have a technical background. Even though 
devices are designed for highest ease-of-use, mistakes in handling can occur. 
This can also involve sample handling (e.g. loading of sample material onto the 
cartridge). Thus, next to cost-efficiency, near patient testing must meet quality 
standards for laboratory testing in healthcare (in Germany defined by RiliBÄK), 
as added by MP:  
“In this context, point-of-care is a little bit difficult at the moment, because point-
of-care or mobile diagnostics are relatively under attack from each side, including 
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RiliBÄK. […] Supervisory authorities share the opinion that staff [professional us-
ers, such as nurses] are not sufficiently educated.”1 
One measure to ensure sufficient education in handling near patient instant diag-
nostics is to further reduce potential sources of error in handling by superior us-
ability design (e.g. intelligent devices: voice guidance next to visual workflow 
guidance and more quality checkpoints within the device). A measure initiated 
my MD innovators is a best practice guide for implementation of MD, including 
user training. This will be available in 2017 and shows that innovators – in this 
case a multidisciplinary team consisting of users as well as legal, training, stand-
ardization, and industry experts – maneuver change by efficient networking. 
Regarding MD reimbursement situation, there is a little light at the end of the 
tunnel: Some test parameters are expected to have lower reimbursement hur-
dles, namely fast diagnostics used to combat infections with resistant bacteria. It 
is assumed that accurate fast diagnostics have a significant impact on patient 
management. This needs to be demonstrated as well. However, the whole pro-
cess is expected to be more straight forward, as the legal framework for medical 
supply in Germany has been renewed very recently. In this context, rapid diag-
nostics used as companion diagnostics for guiding treatment with antibiotics are 
included, as empathized by MP:  
“The remarkable point is there that fast diagnostics – they did not explicitly write 
point-of-care, but fast diagnostics – are included there to combat antibiotic re-
sistances more efficiently.”2 
In January 2017, one German health insurer cares and started a pilot, where 
impact of established near patient rapid tests in decreasing subscription rates of 
antibiotics is evaluated as pilot in a selected region.  
                                            
1 Von daher ist leider bei Point-of-Care gerade ein bisschen schwierig, weil Point-of-Care oder 
Mobile Diagnostik gerade von allen Seiten relativ angegangen wird, auch bei der RiliBÄK. […] 
Die Überwachungsbehörden sind der Meinung, dass das Personal [professionelle Anwender 
wie Schwestern] nicht gut genug ausgebildet ist. 
2 „Dort ist das Besondere, das schnelle Diagnostik – die haben nicht explizit Point-of-Care ge-
schrieben, aber die Schnelle Labordiagnostik -- wird dort benannt, um Antibiotika Resistenzen 
wirksamer bekämpfen zu können.“ 
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These steps need to be triggered actively, e.g. via the German Association of 
Diagnostics Industry (VDGH). In case of mobile diagnostics, network-based ac-
tivities such as those initiated within MD can help to push these technologies 
forward, e.g. in analogy to Luftfahrtcluster (Aviation Cluster) Hamburg as con-
firmed by the PP: 
“A lot of cluster and networks do lobbying ― especially when a critical mass is 
reached”.1 
However, requirement would not only be consensus on goals, but active instead 
of passive networking, as observed for some MD actors.  
 
 
Michael E. Porter outlined the path towards value based healthcare within inte-
grated practice units (IPU). Within IPU healthcare is proposed to follow specific 
key attributes (Porter and Guth, 2012, p. 232):  
 Organized around the patient medical condition or set of closely related 
conditions  
 Involves a dedicated, multidisciplinary team that devotes a significant por-
tion of its time to the condition 
 Providers involved are members of or affiliated with a common organiza-
tional unit 
 Provides the full cycle of care for the condition 
 Encompassing outpatient, inpatient, and rehabilitative care as well as sup-
portive services (e.g. nutrition, social work, behavioral health) 
 Includes patient education, engagement, and follow-up  
 Utilizes a single administrative and scheduling structure 
 Co-located in dedicated facilities 
                                            
1 „Lobby Arbeit machen viele Cluster und Netzwerke – vor allen Dingen, wenn sie eine kritische 
Masse haben.“ 
 
Networking can help to strengthen the voice of start-ups and SME: If there is 
no voice, no vision ― who cares at all? 
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 Led by a physician team captain and a care manager who oversee each 
patient's care process 
 Meets formally and informally on a regular basis 
 Measures outcomes, costs, and processes for each patient using a 
common information platform 
 Accepts joint accountability for outcomes and costs 
To understand and improve value in healthcare, outcome must be measured and 
readily available in an information platform that can be ideally assessed by both 
patient and healthcare providers. Mobile diagnostics can help to support meas-
urement of outcome. However, the key attribute highlighted in bold demonstrates 
that MD does not terminate with the product innovation process, as summarized 
by an EP: 
“Of course, one can do lobbying or something like that, but to allow establishment 
of a product innovation like a mobile diagnostic system and to take maximum 
advantage of it requires system innovation / structural innovation as a next step. 
Something like really the realization of integrated care, which still does not work 
in Germany. […] For us, this is one key outcome of this [MD] and of many other 
projects, where healthcare innovations repeatedly fail in the end: They bounce 
off the structure of the relatively conservative system.” 1 
 
                                            
1 „Man kann natürlich über Lobby oder sowas gehen, aber dass dann eigentlich auch im An-
schluss damit so eine Produktinnovation wie ein mobiles Diagnostiksystem, damit es sich wirk-
lich etablieren kann und damit es maximal genutzt werden kann, dass man da eigentlich auch 
im nächsten Schritt Systeminnovationen bräuchte / Strukturinnovationen. So was wie wirklich 
die Realisierung der integrierten Versorgung, die nach wie vor nicht klappt in Deutschland. […] 
das ist für uns auch ein zentrales Ergebnis aus diesem [MD] und auch aus vielen anderen Pro-
jekten, an dem Gesundheitsinnovationen immer wieder scheitern letztendlich: Sie prallen ein 
bisschen an den Strukturen des doch relativ starren Systems ab.“ 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Initiative Mobile Diagnostics (MD) was arranged around pre-selected barriers ex-
pected to be relevant in healthcare innovation of mobile diagnostic systems in 
Germany. It is important to note that mobile diagnostics are not only helpful in 
supporting immediate clinical decision making in acute care, but can also help to 
improve management of chronical diseases by superior continuous digital moni-
toring. This allows a transformation from reactive to proactive management of 
individuals, as intervention and prevention is expected to merge (Kost et al., 
2015). Digitalization is expected to support this move by empowering patients 
and by generating new business models around health information technologies. 
The global in vitro diagnostics market is estimated to amount to US$ 48 billion in 
2016 (A.T. Kearney, 2013, 7): Near patient (point-of-care) testing represents 
roughly a forth of it (CAGR1, 8%); main drivers are the Americas, EMEA2, and 
APAC3 with a split of 50%, 32%, and 18%, respectively. An important emerging 
market for near patient testing is China (CAGR1, >10%), with large rural areas in 
the West of the country. Expected market size and growth opportunities show 
that MD can represent a significant growth driver for Germany’s high-tech indus-
try: Microsystem technology can balance the strong automotive sector. And even 
firms highly active in the automotive sector may identify mobile diagnostics as 
new business opportunity, such as Bosch (Germany). In the latter case, it can be 
a benefit to use synergies within production capabilities or to transfer know-how 
from system integration, connection and monitoring to this emerging field. 
Nevertheless, the multidisciplinary development approach needed for mobile di-
agnostics is a challenge. The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation (BMGF) took this 
challenge and sponsored innovators who integrate systems for low and middle 
income countries. Targeted disease areas involve particularly Malaria, TB, and 
HIV. In 2013, point-of-care diagnostics firm Alere received roughly each 20 million 
US dollar grant and low-interest subordinate loan, respectively. The loan was 
predominantly for upscaling of the production line, allowing reduction of cost of 
goods sold to a minimum. Although grants from BMGF and other sponsors helped 
                                            
1 CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate 2010 − 2020 
2 EMEA: Europe, Middle East, and Africa 
3 APAC: Asia Pacific 
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to narrow the existing gap in technology, affordable and broadly available diag-
nostics are still an unmet need in resource limited settings and rural areas of more 
developed regions in the world.  
Recently, expert promoters in Global Health presented results from a special 
online platform used for discussing and solving this unmet need (Engel et al., 
2016): Global Health Delivery Project (GHD) at Harvard University1. GDH was 
given birth by a team around Michael E. Porter in 2007. It is meant to support 
maneuvering change in healthcare by using collective intelligence of global net-
workers. The discussion on better access to diagnostics involved 12 expert mod-
erators, including Jim Gallarda from BMGF. Aim of the session was to find new 
paths to better address universal challenges. None of MD expert promoter or 
gatekeeper participated. Now, one could argue that MD networking is restricted 
to Germany with an already high standard in healthcare, whereas the discussion 
on GDH focused and focuses on LIMIC2. Nevertheless, findings of the GHD-
based session showed that barriers for broader implementation of diagnostics 
are similar around the world (Engel et al., 2016, p. 1):  
“Innovation processes need to also include end-users and service innovations, 
the local evidence base needs to be expanded, and guidelines and evaluation 
processes need to be harmonized”. 
Service innovation involves the need for new business models. Thus, MD can be 
either disruptive or radical as may be irritating in Table 1: Disruptive MD (lab-on-
a-chip) can “just” replace laboratory testing3, whereas radical MD allow broader 
distribution by e.g. breaking the value-cost trade-off, being connected, and allow-
ing service remote control. With respect to an envisioned broader distribution, MD 
innovators should not only focus on a single country: Germany alone would not 
ensure return on investment, which may be a factor of 10 higher than the about 
5 million Euro available for some larger MD projects. This is another reason why 
it would make sense to engage not only in local networking, but to broader the 
horizon. 
                                            
1 http://www.ghdonline.org/ (accessed online on February 22, 2017); >19,000 members from 185 
countries 
2 Low and middle income countries 
3 E.g. in the hospital and on weekends, where running a lab test would be too inefficient  
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From these global perspectives and activities back to Germany and its high-tech 
strategy: Main question of this thesis was whether network MD had a sustainable 
impact on healthcare innovation in Germany. This question was answered by the 
help of retrospectives of MD actors: MD had and still has an impact on healthcare 
innovation in Germany. However, the work is not done, as pointed out by one GK: 
“Innovation management is something that I position long-term. […] That’s hard 
work: Innovation management.”1 
In fact, initiative MD tried to address findings of the GDH-based discussion by 
integrating end-users from the beginning into the innovation process. However, 
even though harmonization of MD development and testing was done or is still 
ongoing, standardization of MD evaluation is still open. In addition, activities were 
focused on Germany as funding was provided by BMBF. Generated knowledge 
in form of written paper is only available in German language, except for the 
Roadmap (2015). Although the latter is termed “German” standardization 
roadmap for mobile diagnostic systems it may be a basis for a global one, if net-
working goes beyond Germany. More global networking in case of MD would help 
to flatten the spikes we are facing in healthcare. It may be helpful as well, if cor-
porate innovators do not only get attractive incentives from the government for 
reduced carbon dioxide footprints, but also for increased global health footprints. 
Upscaling of production can help to provide cost-efficient diagnostics in the home 
country.  
As mentioned above, a main remaining external barrier is reimbursement. To jus-
tify a potentially higher pricing in case of near patient testing, it is mandatory to 
demonstrate added value or according to Michael E. Porter (2010, p. 2477): That 
“health outcomes achieved per dollar spent” are higher compared to standard 
laboratory testing. Although this may sound intuitive, it is difficult to target, be-
cause a lot of tacit knowledge is involved. This tacit knowledge makes health 
technology assessment debatable and susceptible for destructive opponents.  
Thus, cost-benefit analyses often lack of quantity and/or quality of studies, repre-
senting a poor basis for decision making. This was exemplified by selected 
                                            
1 “Innovationsmanagement, das ist was, was ich langfristig ansetze. […] Das ist harte Arbeit: 
Innovationsmanagement.” 
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healthcare “innovations” evaluated in a report of Bratan and Wydra (2013, 
p. 140): In many cases, diffusion of innovation is not in line with its benefit/cost 
ratio, resulting in e.g. increasing costs, inefficient use or unexploited benefit in 
healthcare. Consequently, MD innovators have to focus early on applications al-
lowing demonstration of a high benefit/cost ratio.  
A current example and unmet need is fast detection of antimicrobial resistances 
(AMR): High benefit/cost ratio, e.g. by preventing shutting down of operating 
rooms due to contamination or in the worst case death of a patient. Another ben-
efit beyond hospitals would be control of over-use of antibiotics in physician office 
labs. If the need is severe enough, then political decision makers seem to be 
more open towards rapid diagnostics. In this case, a higher willingness-to-inno-
vate has also been observed in health insurer. This is exemplified by a German 
pilot targeting over-use of antibiotics by rapid test-guided clinical decision making. 
In initiative MD, knowledge transfer and generation was used to address limita-
tions in diffusion of innovation, including market access. Notably, not only SME 
experience difficulties in gaining reimbursement, as confirmed by a market ac-
cess expert (MP): 
“[…] We recognize that even for larger firms there is always need for this extreme 
complex reimbursement system that we unfortunately have in Germany – in the 
first place to be able to find orientation in this jungle.”1 
Although larger companies face challenges in market access as well, they have 
more resources or a broader product portfolio that is used to bundle MD e.g. with 
therapeutic agents, as mentioned by an external actor (XT): 
                                            
1 “[…] Da merken wir, auch bei etwas größeren Firmen, dass da immer Bedarf ist für diese extrem 
komplexe Vergütungssystematik, die wir in Deutschland ja leider auch haben – überhaupt erst 
mal diesen Dschungel durchblicken zu können” 
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“The example – the mobile diagnostic system just mentioned – is launched 
against the backdrop that it improves diagnosis of a disease for which the manu-
facturer provides already, shall we say, the most widely distributed, the most 
widely used therapeutic agent.”1 
This shows that larger player are more flexible with respect to value demonstra-
tion and business model innovation. Innovation networks can compensate for this 
disadvantage of smaller firms. For example, integration of expert promoter was 
highly valuable as most participating firms cannot afford to arrange an advisory 
panel accompanying the innovation process.  
Nevertheless, it was observed that not all MD actors were engaged in the activi-
ties driven by expert promoters. For some gatekeepers, networking was even 
terminated or significantly reduced after official termination of MD. Retrospec-
tively, the advantages of innovation networking seemed to be more evident, as 
reflected by a GK: 
“Definitely, we should have used knowledge generation by expert promoters 
more intensively. It was a poor relation. And actually it was an essential part, 
because some of the conversations and presentations were more innovative, to 
my mind.”2 
For better engagement and successful innovation networking, according to the 
process promoter it is important that... 
“[…] key actors involved from the beginning identify the topics. Here, innovation 
management can play a role, but it doesn’t have to. […] It [product or process 
innovation] happens most frequently, when networks have been generated bot-
tom-up, when actors came together, saying: We want to do something together, 
no matter, if there is funding or not.”3 
                                            
1 „Das Beispiel dafür – das Mobile Diagnostik System, von dem ich gerade sprach – wird eigent-
lich vor allem vor dem Hintergrund lanciert, dass es die Diagnostik für eine Erkrankung verbes-
sert, für das der Hersteller das bereits, sagen wir mal, das am weitverbreitetste, meist genutzte 
Medikament zur Verfügung stellt.“ 
2 “Begleitforschung definitiv, die hätten wir mehr nutzen müssen. Die war ein Stiefkind. Und ei-
gentlich war es ein essenzieller Teil, weil da, denke ich, manches war innovativer, was da ge-
redet wurde und präsentiert wurde.“ 
3 “[dass] die Kernakteure, die am Anfang dabei sind, die Themen identifizieren. Da kann Innova-
tion eine Rolle spielen, sie muss nicht. […] Es [Produkt- oder Prozessinnovation] kommt gerade 
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Thus, future activities have to allow freedom-to-operate and ideas coming bot-
tom-up. Like in case of the GDH-based discussion: Interested people met easily 
online ─ without the need for traveling ─ and then knowledge generation started 
as supported by a set of expert moderators. The outcome may be similar to pre-
set barriers in MD, however, its “theirs”, which is a good basis for successful im-
plementation of solutions proposed. In case of MD, some gatekeepers were ob-
viously relatively occupied with administration, financial affairs, and/or technology 
transfer. In this respect, it is evident that before further addressing above men-
tioned external barriers, internal “soft” influencers need to be tuned: Strengthen 
cooperation and transfer (→Figure 1). 
It is reasonable to suggest that coordinators of MD may not be the best gatekeep-
ers due to the fact that they often do not have the “leisure” for knowledge gener-
ation and transfer. In an ongoing MD networking activity, it was observed by the 
researcher that one external innovator was highly engaged. This person is not 
only active in MD-networking, but also frequently attends work-shops and con-
gresses. In addition, this innovator is in close contact with adopters to gather in-
formation for product and service improvement. It is a person in-between market-
ing and R&D, that can easily transfer knowledge from one to the other side of its 
organization: 
“It is taken up relatively grateful – this knowledge around the market: What is the 
target? What do we need to consider? What do I need to be aware of? That 
helped us a lot. It helped us to improve things, to understand things better, to 
understand the user better. […] A lot of information was collected there [MD net-
work activity], which was not easy accessible before or had a limited context.”1 
Obviously this person is embedded in an innovation-friendly organizational cul-
ture, which is able to balance technology-push and market-pull. The innovator 
added further: 
                                            
dann häufig vor, wenn Netzwerke sich wirklich von Bottom-up gebildet haben, wenn Akteure 
sich zusammengetan haben und sagen: Wir wollen etwas zusammen machen, ob es Förderung 
gibt oder nicht.” 
1 “Es wird eigentlich sehr dankbar aufgenommen, muss ich sagen. Also dieses Wissen um den 
Markt: woran müssen wir uns halten? Woran muss man denken? Was muss ich beachten? Das 
hat enorm geholfen hier. Das hat uns geholfen, Sachen zu verbessern, Sachen besser zu ver-
stehen, den Anwender besser zu verstehen. […] Da kam viel Information, an die man vorher 
nicht so ohne weiteres ran kam, oder dass man so einfach in einem besseren Kontext ran kam.“ 
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“And what I believe is very important: To be a little bit ahead of the others; to 
know, what is coming up; to be able to shape; not to be overwhelmed by things.”1 
Boundary spanning is a key soft skill of gatekeeper. It does not only help to transfer 
information into or out of the organization, but it also helps to reach out to individuals 
who serve, e.g. as power promoter. In this thesis, gatekeeper can also be understood 
as relationship manager. An expert manager noted: 
“That this person has these core competences is from my experience very important 
for the success of a consortium. And this is what founding bodies do not take care 
of. It is not covered in the research proposals and then it is a little bit good luck 
somehow, whether this person can and is willing to play the role or not.”2 
SME may not have the resources to train all roles needed for innovation management 
and for setting up a solid house of innovation. A small tent can already be sufficient 
in many cases. However, if there is nothing that protects initiated innovation pro-
cesses against external or internal destructive opponents, then there is high risk of 
not being able to handle the targeted challenge successfully. Established innovation 
management has not been described by actors interviewed. Networks and cluster 
can help to close potential gaps in innovation management capabilities, as pointed 
out by the process promoter: 
“Regarding network and knowledge transfer, we are especially successful in case of 
education and training, when employees of firms are to be further developed.”3 
Initiative MD may offer team checks in order to find out whether role playing is pos-
sible or whether actors could benefit from fine tuning, e.g. to be able to do better 
probing / Buddy Checks in case of technology transfer. The latter turned out to be 
still an internal barrier for several involved organization, although this topic is an “old 
hat”. Nevertheless, data on funding of biotech start-ups are still not convincing in 
                                            
1 “Und ich denke, was auch immer ganz wichtig ist, dass man so ein bisschen vor anderen ist; 
dass man schon weiß, was kommt; dass man mitgestalten kann; dass man nicht so überfallen 
wird von Sachen.” 
2 Dass die Person diese zentralen Kompetenzen hat, das ist aus meiner Erfahrung für den Erfolg 
von einem Konsortium enorm wichtig. Und da achten die Fördergeber nicht drauf. Das wird in 
den Anträgen nicht thematisiert, und dann ist es ist letztendlich so ein kleines bisschen ein 
Glücksfall irgendwie, ob die Person diese Rolle ausführen kann und will oder nicht. 
3 Wo wir besonders erfolgreich sind, im Prinzip, bei dem Thema Netzwerk und Wissenstransfer, 
ist bei der Aus- und Weiterbildung, wenn es darum geht, Arbeitskräfte, die in Firmen sind, weiter 
zu entwickeln. 
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case of Germany. According to BioCentury Online Intelligence (BCIQ), average mil-
lion US dollar raised by German biotech start-ups per financing round A was seven 
in 20141 (Huggett, 2015). Globally, this result positioned Germany at place ten, with 
Switzerland at the top of the list2, followed by UK. The US3 was at 3rd position. In 
2015, average series A funding of German biotech start-up was $13.5 M, but data 
are based on two start-ups only (Huggett, 2016). US biotech start-ups were again 
more successful in raising money: $1.5 billion by 67 start-ups (average was $22.1 
M). In 2016, it was not surprising to see that China continued to catch up. The US 
was at the top of the list with 76 academic starts-up collecting in round A (Huggett, 
2017). Even though Germany has roughly four times less inhabitants compared to 
the US, the number of three start-ups in this round is to be improved. So much for 
competitiveness and prosperity (→Figure 1). 
Although this is only a snap shot, it may be a hint that biotech start-ups in Germany 
still did not gain enough momentum. Retrospectives of MD showed that technology 
transfer is still not easy in Germany. On the one hand, there is a lack of venture 
capitalists who are non-risk averse and willing to invest high amounts of money. They 
rather stay apart from the relatively long lead times related to biotech start-ups. On 
the other hand, German biotech entrepreneurs may not be very successful in raising 
funds. According to in-sider Steve Blank, scientific entrepreneurs are often not well 
prepared, when investors ask for details on customers and revenue models. Steve 
Blank was responsible for the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and started to 
further develop biotech entrepreneurs with respect to innovation selling4 (Rathi, 
2015). His main advice for his trainees is to accept that they have nothing but hy-
potheses that have to be challenged by customers for establishing a commercializa-
tion model. 
Nearly a decade ago, in 2008, Luong and colleagues concluded (2008, p. 499):  
“The development of ideal biosensors which are fast, easy to use, speciﬁc, and 
inexpensive, doubtlessly, requires the signiﬁcant upfront investment to support 
R&D efforts and this is a key challenge in the commercialization of biosensors. 
                                            
1 Calculated on the basis of 5 rounds and a total fund of $34.4 M 
2 5 A rounds with a total raised funding of $104.1 M 
3 61 A rounds, resulting in $961.6 M ($17.5 M in average) 
4 Web-based publication by Akshat Rathi, September 16, 2015: Why scientists make bad entre-
preneurs—and how to change that: https://qz.com/502143/why-scientists-make-bad-entrepre-
neurs-and-how-to-change-that/ (accessed on February 24, 2017) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
75 
To date, progress in biosensor development is somewhat incremental with low 
success rates and there is the absence for huge volume markets except for glu-
cose sensors. The future trend includes the integration of biosensor technology 
with leading-edge integrated circuit, wireless technology and miniaturization.” 
Today, it is the phase of MD system integration. However, glucose measurement 
is still this huge volume market for near or in patient testing. It is dominated by 
two player, namely Abbott and Roche. Notably, it can be observed, that innova-
tion is more radical. MD are so small that these can be implanted as in vivo sensor 
and the business model is changing significantly: Some insurer started to provide 
equipment for glucose detection on their website. Of course, physicians are inte-
grated into this process. Reduction of administration is meant to allow more pa-
tient centered rather than administration centered approach. This maneuvered 
change was possible by a certain power which is definitely behind these players. 
One remark regarding player Abbott: End of 2015, US online publisher STAT 
presented a small device termed “MAP”1, i.e. Mobile Analysis Platform, alias MD. 
MAP may not have been on the radar of MD innovators. Interestingly, the MAP 
prototype was developed within a collaboration involving Abbott and DARPA2. It 
seems to follow a more radical innovation process as the target is multiple detec-
tion of both immunological and molecular parameter in a cost-efficient manner.  
Back to competitiveness: Retrospectives on MD confirmed that small firms have 
difficulties in finding their niche or their bigger partner or a sponsor. Further sup-
port in this field should be intensified in MD networking. However, as assumed 
by the process promoter: Activities of network MD are expected to continue to go 
down. An important next step is therefore to support or recover still existing ac-
tivities and to secure knowledge generated in this field. Transfer of activities to 
powerful so called “top” cluster and networks would be one measure to circum-
vent loss of knowledge generated. One AD had the impression that… 
 
 
                                            
1 https://www.statnews.com/2015/11/24/darpa-biotech-infectious-disease/ (accessed on Febru-
ary 24, 2017) 
2 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
76 
“Everyone was focused on the individual work package. To make this project to-
gether successful in the end, someone would have been needed who oversees 
the whole picture and who takes care of it.”1 
With respect to the holistic approach needed to drive innovation in this field, it is 
obvious that this thesis has several limitations. First of all, not all multidisciplinary 
innovators were included for generating the retrospective: For example only six 
gatekeepers were involved, which is about the half, since 11 projects participated. 
A general conclusion is therefore not possible. A major weakness is that inter-
views were performed about one and a half year after termination of MD. Some 
interview partners had difficulties in recovering all relevant information. This was 
most evident in case of power promoter who were more distant actors in MD ─ 
maybe too far away from the activities. Consequently, insights directly related to 
the particular project were limited or even absent in power promoter. Neverthe-
less, there was evidence that at least in case of gatekeepers, interviews may be 
helpful to reconsider ongoing or follow-up projects in the field of MD.  
Due to the time lag, it is reasonable to assume that only remarkable information 
was transferred within interviews, whereas nuances were difficult to recover. Ret-
rospectives should be included in all projects immediately in order to adjust ma-
neuvering of change efficiently. This thesis shows that a delayed retrospective 
may not help to save and transfer all knowledge generated in time. Furthermore, 
retrospectives are best, when performed by a person not involved in MD. This is 
not the case for this thesis: The researcher was involved – at least to a certain 
degree – and brings a bias into qualitative data analyses. Even though the re-
searcher tried to evaluate the case objectively, several subjective elements were 
introduced.  
One example is the choice of the interview partner: It was not randomized and 
included mainly MD actors who were related to the researcher. Only some partner 
were not familiar with the interviewer. In this case, another bias may be intro-
duced as semi-structured qualitative analyses are influenced by the level of trust. 
This is a disadvantage of qualitative studies which are also limited by the fact that 
                                            
1 „Jeder hat eigentlich bloß auf seine eigene Aufgabe geschaut, und um das Projekt dann hinter-
her zusammen erfolgreich zu machen, hätte es jemanden bedurft, der das Ganze sieht und das 
Ganze in die Hand nimmt.“ 
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generalization is difficult or not possible. Although the researcher tried to create 
a trustful atmosphere, it was observed in case of few specific questions that more 
distant partners tended to behave not as open as closely related actors. In addi-
tion, it has to be noted that nearly all interviews were performed via telephone, 
where trust may not be installed easily. However, in telephone interviews it can 
be expected that interviewees more likely forget that conversations are being rec-
orded to ensure quality.  
Despite these limitations, this thesis was able to highlight major remaining chal-
lenges. Notably, these are not only external barriers as knowledge generated 
within initiative Mobile Diagnostics already had a slight impact on healthcare in-
novation in Germany. For example, MD helped actors to better address regula-
tory barriers and standardization of MD development and implementation. More-
over, networking created awareness and onboarded external innovators who 
continue to drive activities. However, a significant external barrier remains: Re-
imbursement by standardized technology evaluation. Next to this external barrier, 
internal hurdles were identified which should be addressed before expanding ac-
tivities or launching new initiatives. For strengthening of networking and transfer, 
the following key lessons learnt may be taken into account: 
 Address both “hard” (e.g. technology, regulatory) and “soft” barriers (e.g. 
willingness-to-innovate, bridging)  
 Ensure that each actor empathizes with her or his role and that each key 
character is involved: Rearrange or exchange actors, if necessary. 
 Remove blinkers and use synergies with other networks or initiatives for 
allowing creation of a larger collective intelligence: Find the path via 360° 
 Include a “Hard Test” (e.g. the DARPA1 one) into the innovation process 
 Use networking to create a clear vision that makes important stakeholder 
care, including user and power promoter / financiers  
 
 
                                            
1 Referring to the Stanford University Foresight Model, SFM (2013). 
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